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Introduction
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon1 has seen Member States acquire the
formal right to withdraw from the European Union (EU), following the
procedure outlined in new Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU).2 Whilst Public International Law (PIL) already recognized the existence
of a sovereign right to withdraw from consensual commitments,3 including
unilaterally,4 it was at best questionable whether Member States could have
availed themselves of a right to withdraw from the EU prior to the advent
of the Treaty of Lisbon, especially if purporting to claim a right of
* The authors are, respectively, Senior Legal Counsel, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am
Main, Germany, E-mail: phoebus.athanassiou@ecb.int and Assistant Professor, Law School,
UCLan Cyprus. E-mail: SLaulhe-Shaelou@uclan.ac.uk. The views expressed in this paper are
solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective institutions.
1 OJ C 306, 17 December 2007.
2 An in-depth examination of Art. 50 TEU lies outside the scope of this paper. For an account of
Art. 50 TEU see P Athanassiou, ‘Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU, some reflec-
tions’ Legal Working Paper Series No 10, ECB, 2009; H Hofmeister, ‘ “Should I stay or should I
go?”—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU’ (2010) 16(5) European Law
Journal 589; A Lazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the EU and Alternatives to Membership’ (2012) 37(5)
EL Rev 523; A Tatham, ‘ “Don’t mention divorce at the wedding, darling!”: EU Accession and
Withdrawal after Lisbon’ in A Biondi et al (eds) EU Law after Lisbon (OUP, Oxford 2012); and
P Nicolaides, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects’ (2013) 20 (2,
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 209. For pre-Lisbon Treaty works, see
H de Waele, ‘The EU on the Road to a New Legal Order—The Changing Legality of Member
State Withdrawal’ (2004–05) 12 Tilburg Foreign Law Review 168; R Friel, ‘Providing a
Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Art. 59 of the draft European
Constitution’ (2004) ICLJ 407, 414 and fn 34; and J Herbst, ‘Observations on the Right to
Withdraw from the EU: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties”?’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1755.
3 Under PIL, a right of withdrawal may exist either because the parties to a treaty mutually agree
that withdrawal is permissible, whether at the time of the treaty’s drafting or ex post (see Art. 54 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331) or because it is
possible to read a right of withdrawal into a treaty, whether by interpreting the parties’ intentions or
because such a right would be consistent with the nature of the treaty itself (ibid Art. 56).
4 Under PIL, unilateral withdrawal is possible under the rebus sic standibus (‘fundamental change
of circumstances’) clause of Art. 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. On the
relevance of Art. 62 in the EU context, see J Hill, ‘The EEC: The Right of Member State Withdrawal’
(1982) 12 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 335; S. Berglund, ‘Prison or
Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of Withdrawal from the EU’ (2006) 29 Scandinavian
Political Studies 147; and Athanassiou (n 2) 12–18.
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unilateral withdrawal.5 The perpetual nature of the Treaties,6 the on-going
process of ever-closer European integration, and the judicially declared irrevoc-
ability of the transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to the EU7 gave
rise to warranted doubts, prior to the advent of the Treaty of Lisbon, as to the
existence of any Member State right to withdraw from the EU.8 Post-Treaty of
Lisbon, not only has the Member States’ right to withdraw from the EU been
formally recognized but, what is more, there are already intimations that this
newly attributed right could be exercised in the foreseeable future.9
Apart from a raising a number of questions with regard to its actual scope and
the concrete consequences of its exercise,10 the recognition of the Member
States’ right to withdraw is apt to open-up new lines of enquiry relevant to
other distinct scenarios with no less of an impact on the EU’s composition. One
such scenario is that of the non-consensual separation (‘secession’) of part of the
territory of an EU Member State, motivated by a desire for national independ-
ence. ‘Secession’ is, of course, not the same as ‘withdrawal’, within the meaning
of Article 50 TEU, which only contemplates the wholesale departure of a
Member State from the EU. It is, however, a germane concept: if EU law
allows Member States to withdraw from the EU in toto, what would it have
to say about the legal consequences of the separation from a Member State of
part of its territory? In particular, would EU law recognize an automatic right of
accession to the EU for the benefit of newly created (‘seceding’) state entities
(leading, per force, to an ‘internal enlargement’ of the EU) or would it resist any
attempt at ‘accession from within’, unless and until the normal accession
5 The possibility of unilateral denunciation of EU membership has been envisaged by national
courts in several jurisdictions, including the UK (McCarthys Ltd v Smith [1979] 3 All ER 325),
France (Administration des Douanes v Socie´te´ Cafe´s Jacque Vabre & J Weigel et Cie SARL [1975] 2
CMLR 336) and Germany (Maastricht Urteil [BVerfGE 89, 155 vom 12 Oktober 1993]; Lisbon
Urteil [BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30 June 2009]). The negotiated departure of Greenland would
appear to confirm that unilateral withdrawal was, at least originally, neither intended nor implied
under the Treaties (see F Harhoff, ‘Greenland’s Withdrawal from the EC’ [1983] 20 Common Market
Law Review 13 , 28–31). It has been argued that, ‘it was the very fact that Greenland remained a part
of Denmark that made it necessary that its withdrawal from the EC be a negotiated one’
(M Happold, ‘Independence: In or Out of Europe? An Independent Scotland and the EU’
[2000] 49 ICLQ 15, 32), meaning that Denmark could have unilaterally denounced Greenland’s
participation in the Communities if no consent had been reached for its departure.
6 See Art. 53 TEU.
7 See ns 152 and 153.
8 The referendum held in June 1975 over the UK’s European future suggests that withdrawal was
deemed legally possible in at least one jurisdiction. On the UK referendum of June 1975 see Friel
(n 2) 408 and fn 11; and Athanassiou (n 2) 12 and fn 24.
9 Post-Lisbon, Prime Minister Cameron vowed to offer Britons a simple ‘in/out’ referendum
choice provided he won the general elections scheduled for 2015. This followed Prime Minister
Cameron’s previous call for a referendum on Britain’s relationship with the EU, defeated at the
House of Commons in October 2011. On the legal regime applicable in the UK following the
enactment of the EU Bill 2011, and on the quasi-systematic need to hold a referendum for any Treaty
change, see P Craig, ‘The European Union Act 2011: Locks, Limits and Legality’ (2011) 48
Common Market Law Review 1915.
10 In this regard see Athanassiou (n 2) 22–31.
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procedure of Art. 49 TEU has been complied with? Suffice it to say from the
outset that no major EU law legal issues would a priori arise where a newly
created state entity would not wish to be part of the EU (nor would there be any
basis to invoke, in such a case, the newly introduced withdrawal possibility of
Article 50 TEU in order to arrange for the newly created state entity’s depart-
ure).11 It is only where a newly created state entity would evince the desire to
‘continue being part of the EU’ that the delicate EU legal issue of its right of
accession to the EU (automatic or otherwise) would need to be tackled.
The aim of this paper is to examine the EU law-related issues arising from a
secession scenario.12 To achieve its aim, this paper is divided in two Parts. Part I
examines the possibility of an ‘internal EU enlargement’ (or ‘EU accession from
within’), with an emphasis on the potential existence of a ‘right to automatic
accession to the EU’ (or, better put, a right of ‘retention’ of accession to the
EU). As will be argued in Part I, there is, as a matter of EU law, no automatic
right to EU accession in a genuine secession scenario; it will also be argued that a
newly created state entity would not enjoy, as a matter of PIL, any a priori rights
of state succession to the rights and obligations of the ‘rump’ Member State
(diminished in territory and population) deriving from the latter’s membership
of the EU. Therefore, EU membership talks would be mandatory, both in terms
of outcome (through compliance with the enlargement process) and in terms of
procedure (through compliance with the enlargement criteria), even if an expe-
dited accession process might be conceivable.13 Part II of this paper explores the
issue of the existence of a ‘right to automatic accession to EMU’ (the most
central but exclusive of all areas of EU integration)14 for newly created state
entities that were formerly part of a euro area Member State. As will be argued
in Part II, newly created state entities resulting from secession from an existing
euro area Member State would need to ‘join the queue’, and fulfil the EMU
11 See S Peers, ‘The Future of EU Treaty Amendments’ (2012) 31(1) Yearbook of European
Law 17 60.
12 For instance, in Catalonia the ruling party announced its intention to hold a referendum on
Catalan independence if it won the next regional elections, despite the Spanish government’s claim
that such action would be illegal (see M Happold ‘Catalan Independence and the EU’, available at
<http://www.catdem.org/cat/notices/2012/12/catalan-independence-and-the-european-union-
7034.php>, last accessed 26 August 2013. For his part, Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond
expressed the desire for an independent Scotland ‘from within the context of the EU’ (see
M Weller, ‘A Foregone Conclusion?’ (2012)NLJ 162(7537), available at <http://www.newlaw
journal.co.uk/nlj/content/foregone-conclusion>, last accessed 26 August 2013).
13 The general presumption is that, ‘the accession of new Member States to the Community is
carried out by means of acts which have the status of primary law and can change pre-existing
situations in any area of Community law whatsoever, the maintenance in force of existing
Community rules being the course generally followed’ (see Joint Cases C-63/90 and 67/90,
Portugese Republic and Kingdom of Spain v Council of the EC [1992] ECR I-05073, para. 49). Also
see S Laulhe´ Shaelou, The EU and Cyprus: Principles and Strategies of Full Integration (Brill/Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2010) 97.
14 Despite the fact that all of the Treaties’ objectives, as set out in Art. 3 TEU, are of prime
importance, the establishment of EMU is, arguably, the only Treaty objective in the context of
which further admission conditions need to be fulfilled (see para. 4 of Art. 3 TEU).
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accession criteria before adopting the single currency, following the EMU
accession procedure prescribed in the Treaty.
Before turning to the substance of the analysis in this paper, it is useful to
briefly consider a few points of terminology. A caveat and a word of caution are
also apposite.
‘Secession’ can be defined as the non-consensual (even if not belligerent) sep-
aration of part of the territory of an existing state, without such separation
resulting in the extinction of the predecessor state.15 Examples include the break-
up of Belgium from the Netherlands, in 1830, and that of Pakistan from British
India, in 1948. The standard, decolonization-era account based claims to the
creation of so-called ‘newly independent states’16 upon the principle of self-
determination, following which nations and peoples have the inalienable right to
determine freely their destiny.17 Outside the decolonization context (which is
not relevant for the analysis in this paper), it is difficult to argue that there exists
an absolute right to secession in cases of grievances internal to a state, since the
recognition of any such right would violate the fundamental PIL principle of
territorial integrity.18 The opposite of secession is ‘dissolution’, which can be
defined as the fragmenting, negotiated or otherwise, of an existing state into two
or more new state entities (which may, but need not be, co-terminous with
preceding territorial components), resulting in the extinction of the predecessor
state.19 The dismemberment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY), and the demise of Czechoslovakia provide examples of non-consensual
(or ‘genuine’) and negotiated dissolution, respectively. Several other paths to
statehood exist, including the ‘separation’ of a voluntary union of states into its
original constituent parts—a reversion, so to speak, to the status quo ante—as in
the case of the break-up, in 1961, of the United Arab Republic into the pre-
union sovereign States of Syria and Egypt or the ‘fusion’ of two or more
states into a new one, as in the case of Germany’s re-unification, in 1990.20
15 Crawford and Boyle have defined secession as ‘the process by which a group seeks to separate
itself from the state to which it belongs and to create a new state on part of that state’s territory’
(J Crawford and A Boyle, ‘Annex A—Opinion: Referendum on the Independence of Scotland—
International Law Aspects’ in ‘Scotland analysis: devolution and the implications of Scottish inde-
pendence’, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/79408/Annex_A.pdf>, 12 February 2013, last accessed 26 August 2013 72.
16 The term applies to states resulting from decolonization, and is defined in the 1978 Vienna
Convention as ‘a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the succession
of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was
responsible’ (see Art. 2. f ).
17 See, generally, MN Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 251–7;
J Combacau and S Sur, Droit international public (5th edn, Montchrestien, Paris 2001) 264; and
T Schweisfurth, Vo¨lkerrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tu¨bingen 2006) 328.
18 P Dailler and A Pellet, Droit international public (LGDJ, Paris 2002) 526.
19 Ibid 525–6.
20 It is equally possible to treat the German re-unification as an example of absorption of one state
by another rather than as one of a merger (in this regard, see I Brownlie, Principles of Public
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These alternative paths to statehood are not examined below, as they are not
relevant to this paper.
The caveat is that it is not the authors’ intention to focus on specific cases of
potential secession affecting specific EU Member States. Their aim is, instead, to
identify common legal issues arising out of secession scenarios that are or could
be of relevance to EU Member States in general, without regard to national
specificities, legal or other.
Finally, a word of caution: despite the existence of a strong political dimen-
sion to the secession debate, the arguments presented in this paper are purely
legal. Political or philosophical considerations having an impact (perhaps a
decisive one) on the questions examined in this paper will be no part of the
authors’ analysis.21
I. ‘Internal EU enlargement?’: the EU and PIL perspectives
Part I examines whether a newly created state entity would automatically be
bound by the obligations and enjoy the rights and prerogatives of the EU
Member State whose sovereign power it has displaced over part of the latter’s
territory through the act of secession (including rights and obligations deriving
from its membership of the EU). This question is addressed both from the
perspective of EU law (section A) and from that of PIL (section B).
A. EU law considerations
(i) Introductory remarks: the rump Member State’s legal position in a genuine
secession scenario
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the Treaty of Lisbon has expressly recognized
the Member States’ right to withdraw from the EU, following the procedure
outlined in new Article 50 TEU.22
International Law (7th edn, OUP, Oxford 2008) 964–6; P Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern
Introduction to International Law (Routledge, London/New York 1997) 167–8).
21 For an example of some of those considerations and an assessment of their possible impact on the
secession debate see A Roldan and N Brullet, ‘El dilemma del prisoniero catala´n’ El Paı´s, 28 January
2013, 29.
22 Unlike in the case of EU accession, no criteria apply in the case of withdrawal. Art. 50(1) TEU
provides that any Member State may withdraw from the EU in accordance with its own constitu-
tional (ie internal) requirements. Despite being an instance of ‘redefinition’ of a Member State’s
territory rather than of state secession, which preceded the introduction by the Treaty of Lisbon of the
exit clause, the case of Greenland would appear to be a good illustration of ‘internal considerations
leading to potential withdrawal’ (Tatham (n 2) 148–9). Following the introduction of ‘home rule’ in
1979, and the holding of a referendum on membership of the Communities by the Greenlandic
government in 1982, the Danish government ‘acted upon’ the request by the Greenlandic govern-
ment and requested the Council ‘to amend the Treaties in order to allow for the withdrawal of
Greenland and its transfer to the status of OCT’ (E.C. Bull, Supplement 1/83, 6 (request to the
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Article 50 TEU would, a priori, be irrelevant to the secession scenario that is
the focus of this paper, since the Treaty of Lisbon recognizes a right of with-
drawal for the benefit of each of the Member States, rather than for the benefit
of parts thereof, which, by definition, cannot negotiate their withdrawal from
the EU since they have never been EU members in their own right.23 At the
same time, there is nothing in the Treaties to suggest the existence of any
obligation for the rump Member State to withdraw from the EU24 or to other-
wise re-negotiate its relationship with its partners merely because of incidents of
secession affecting its territory and population.25 It is recalled that the territory
of Member States is to be determined by reference to national (including
Constitutional) law considerations,26 rather than by reference to the EU
Treaties.27 As no Treaty amendments would appear necessary to reflect changes
Council) and COM(83) 66 final (Commission’s opinion)). The Danish government entered into
negotiations (on behalf of Greenland) with other Member States, to decide on Greenland’s with-
drawal and on its transformation into an OCT. These negotiations gave rise to an amending Treaty
on Greenland ([1985] OJ L29/1) passed on the basis of the now repealed Art. 236 EEC (formal
Treaty revision procedure requiring unanimity), which took effect with Greenland’s withdrawal on 1
February 1985 (see Tatham (n 2), 146–7; see also S Blockmans, ‘Between the Devil and the Deep
Blue Sea? Conflicts in External Action Pursued by OCTs and the EU’ in D Kochenov (ed.), EU Law
of the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2011), 312–14; F Weiss, ‘Greenland’s withdrawal from
the European Communities’ (1985) 10 European Law Review 173; and Harhoff (n 5) 17–21.
23 See Happold (n 5) 32–3; and ‘Scottish nationalists in EU “fantasy land” ’, available at
<http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/print-article.asp?id=2845>, last accessed on 26 August
2013. In case of the independence of a seceding entity (rather than of EU withdrawal) it would
not be possible for the Council to reflect on the practice of Art. 49 TEU for EU accession and to
request, by analogy, opinions and proposals from the other EU institutions, on the eventual with-
drawal of the entity seeking independence (see Tatham (n 2) 150 with respect to the procedure for the
withdrawal of a Member State). Contra Edward, who has expressed the view that Art. 50 TEU could
be extended to cater for the needs of seceding state entities (see Edward, ‘Scotland and the European
Union’, Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum blog, 17 December 2012, available at<http://www.
scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/
ArticleView/articleId/852/David-Edward-Scotland-and-the-European-Union.aspx>, accessed on 6
January 2014).
24 See Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 68 and 99 (arguing that the UK’s EU membership would not
‘lapse’ in the event that Scotland would attain its independence).
25 For the extent to which such adjustments to the rump Member State would need to be reflected
in the EU Treaties, see Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the EU (Thomson/Sweet &
Maxwell 2005) 356.
26 See Case 148/77, Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978] ECR 1787, where the Court ruled
with respect to the territorial extent of an EU Member State, as set out in then Art. 227 EEC (now
Articles 52 TEU and 355 TFEU), that ‘the status of the French overseas departments within the
Community is primarily defined by reference to the French constitution . . .’ (para. 10)). Also see
Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 101.
27 Post-Lisbon, new Art. 52 (1) TEU merely sets out a list of Member States, while Art. 52(2) TEU
refers to Art. 355 TFEU for details of the territorial scope of the Treaties. For its part, Art. 355 TFEU
refers to specific territories of the Member States (including by reference to Annex II) and also
provides for a ‘passerelle’ clause for some of these territories (Art. 355(6) TFEU). There is, however,
no mention in Article 355 TFEU of the territories of certain Member States (in particular, there is no
reference to the possibility for Spanish or British territories to benefit from the passerelle clause).
Moreover, the passerelle clause only concerns current Overseas Countries or Territories (OCTs) and
Outermost Regions (ORs) and it is therefore ‘impossible to employ this procedure to change the
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to a Member State’s borders,28 it would be open to a Member State ‘to change
the territorial scope of the Treaties unilaterally’, for instance by granting inde-
pendence to a seceding entity (or, a fortiori, by suffering a reduction in its
territory and population on account of a unilateral act of secession).29
Besides, there are several examples to date30 of variations in respect of the
territory, population, or internal structure of specific Member States, which
have been addressed without a Member State exit, and without the need to
amend the Treaties.31,32 In a genuine secession scenario, within the meaning of
this paper, the rump Member State would therefore continue to be bound by
the Treaties:33 it is only if it were to evince the desire to withdraw, independently
of the act of secession affecting it, that it could be absolved of its Treaty
status of a Member State region or territory even if they are referred to in Art. 355(6) TFEU, if such a
region or territory does not fall within the two statuses’ D Kochenov, ‘The EU and the Overseas:
Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the Union, and Territories
sui generis’ in D Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas
Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2011),
60–3, 62).
28 See also the ‘moving treaty boundary’ concept in Happold (n 5) 33.
29 See Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 101, with respect to the UK.
30 On changes to the constitutional status of overseas and/or other (semi)-autonomous territories/
dependencies of Member States, and their impact on the EU Treaties, see Kochenov (n 27); and
S Laulhe´ Shaelou, ‘The Principle of Territorial Exclusion in the EU: SBAs in Cyprus—a Special Case
of sui generis Territories in the EU’ in D Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas: Outermost Regions,
Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Kluwer Law International, The
Netherlands, 2011). Greenland’s departure from the EEC did not affect Denmark’s membership,
although the territorial scope of application of the Treaties changed as a result. Despite being an
autonomous territory since 1979, Greenland remains part of Denmark and has yet to gain inde-
pendence (see Blockmans (n 22) 312–14; and Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 99).
31 The German reunification provides a case in point, as no specific amendment was made to the
EC Treaties to reflect the increase in the Federal Republic of Germany’s territory and population (see
J-P Jaque´, ‘German Unification and the EC’ (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law, 1).
32 Variations in a Member State’s territory and population may, depending on their nature and
scope, have an impact on a Member State’s representation and voting rights (see Crawford and Boyle
(n 15), 100; and Happold (n 5) 20)). With respect to voting rights and the rules on Member States’
representation at the EU institutions, these may be contained in secondary legislation, as in the case
of the European Parliament (Art. 14(2) TEU). Acts of secondary legislation, by their very nature, can
be amended without recourse to primary law, unless they are themselves the result of a Treaty
amendment (as in the case of Greenland’s withdrawal, which entailed changes to secondary legisla-
tion) or, by way of exception, in the context of EU accession (under the conditions of admission as set
out in Art. 49 TEU and interpreted by the Court of Justice) (see Peers (2012), 19 and 27; see also
Laulhe´ Shaelou (2010) 96–98). In the case of the Council, the main rules on voting weights are based
on population and, as of 2014, automatically take into consideration a drop in population of a
Member State (see Art. 16(4) TEU; and Peers (n 11) 61 and fn 257). In theory, any other hypo-
thetical change to primary law outside of the scope of the EU accession process would need to be
addressed through one of the revision procedures (ie under Art. 48 TEU and/or possibly under one of
the passerelle clauses of the Treaties, if relevant). It is logical to assume that any Treaty changes made
on the basis of Art. 48 TEU would be addressed, probably, at the same time as the new state entity’s
Accession Treaty, to avoid a multiplication of Treaty revision processes.
33 Contra Matas et al who argue that both the successor State(s) and the predecessor State (if still
existing) would be responsible ‘jointly and severally’ for the Treaty obligations of the Member State
from which they have resulted (see Jordi Matas i Dalmases et al, ‘The Internal Enlargement of the
EU’, Centre Maurits Coppieters, 2010, 69.
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obligations, subject to fulfilment of the procedural requirements laid down in
Article 50 TEU.
In light of the above, the EU law position of the rump Member State in a
genuine secession scenario is, in the authors’ opinion, clear: the rump Member
State would carry forward its legal personality and continue to enjoy its EU
membership rights and obligations notwithstanding secession, without the
changes to its territory resulting from secession raising particular concerns as
a matter of primary EU law. What the position of the newly created state entity
would be is, however, a different matter. Can the newly created state entity claim
an automatic right of (re)accession to the EU, or would it need to follow the
regular accession procedure before acceding to the EU? These questions are
addressed in subsection (ii).
(ii) Automatic EU (re-)accession?
Outside Article 49 TEU, there is no dedicated Treaty provision specifically
on the situation of newly created state entities and/or on their EU accession
(or (re-)accession) rights. Nor, as explained below, is there any reason, either in
logic or in law, why there should be any such provision.
The general principles of EU law, including those of equal treatment, legal
certainty, and legitimate expectations, require that the enlargement conditions
are uniform and apply erga omnes,34 to ensure that one can objectively ascertain
whether or not the terms, conditions, and procedure applicable to EU accessions
have been complied with in any given case.35 In the case of the EU Treaties, the
34 This had been the case since the Treaty of Maastricht, which replaced the three different acces-
sion clauses in the founding Treaties with a single provision, Art. O TEU (now Art. 49 TEU). See also
Case 93/78, Mattheus v Doego [1978] ECR 2203, where the ECJ interpreted former Art. 237 EEC
(now Art. 271 TFEU) as establishing ‘a precise procedure encompassed within well-defined limits for
the admission of new Member States’ (emphasis added), to be found not only in the enlargement
procedure itself (including the Copenhagen criteria) but, arguably, also in the parts of the Treaties
underlying the ‘very foundations’ of the EU, and including the general principles of Union law (see
C Hillion, ‘EU enlargement’ in Craig and De Bu´rca (eds) Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford 2011)
213). For a comprehensive and up-to-date legal appraisal of the general principles of EU law, see
T Tridimas, The General Principles of the EU Law (2nd edn OUP 2009). For a legal analysis of former
Art. 237 EEC, its evolution in the context of EU enlargement, and the delimitation of conditions of
admission and pre-Treaty of Lisbon adjustments to the Treaties, see Laulhe´ Shaelou (n 13) 96–8.
35 The way in which the accession procedure is regulated in the TEU has been viewed, by some, as
too modest, ‘leaving the rest to customary rules and practice’ (see Lazowski (n 2) fn 5; see also Tatham
(n 2) 134). The political framework of EU enlargement created at the 1993 Copenhagen European
Council may have initially belonged to the realm of intergovernmentalism but was then further
elaborated on and ‘systematized’ in subsequent European Council meetings, and in Treaty revisions
(starting with Amsterdam), including with reference to the basic accession conditions articulated in
Copenhagen (see Hillion (n 34) 193–7). The Treaty of Lisbon has now advanced further this exercise
of codification of past practices and routines with respect to the EU enlargement policy (including
through an express reference in Art. 49 TEU to the ‘conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the
European Council’ to be ‘taken into account’), thereby bringing this policy clearly into the supra-
national realm of EU law despite arguably going beyond the perimeter of the EU acquis stricto sensu.
As noted by a commentator, however, this codification process may still be incomplete: ‘[s]hort of a
full codification of the post-Copenhagen substantive and procedural rules of enlargement
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terms and conditions in question are to be found in Article 49 TEU, to which
the Treaty of Lisbon has inter alia added (by way of a supplementary pre-
condition for EU accession) a reference to the Union’s values, as per new
Article 2 TEU.36 Besides, following the introduction by the Treaty of Lisbon
of an exit clause, even a former Member State (ie one that has withdrawn) would
need to comply with the procedure set out in Article 49 TEU if it wished to re-
join the EU.37 Despite the fact that, as argued earlier in this paper, Article 50
TEU is of no relevance to the secession scenario that is the focus of this paper, it
seems difficult to argue that what applies to the whole should not apply to its
parts: it is, in other words, difficult to argue that a former Member State should
be treated less favourably than a newly created state entity resulting from seces-
sion that was never part of the European family as a sovereign state. Far from
enjoying any right of automatic accession, the new state entity should therefore
be expected to comply with the Treaties’ enlargement conditionality policy as a
condition precedent to its EU accession.38
Absent any dedicated primary law provision, and lacking any indication that,
in a genuine secession scenario, EU law would, contrary to PIL, treat the
seceding state entity as a successor state,39 newly created state entities wishing
to join the ranks of the EU would need to forge their own relationship with the
EU. Compliance with the Copenhagen criteria would be the foundation of that
relationship.40 While a detailed examination of the Copenhagen criteria lies
outside the scope of this paper, suffice it to note that, in order to join the
EU, applicant states need to demonstrate institutional stability, as a guarantee
for democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights and respect for (and
protection of ) minorities (the ‘political criterion’). They also need to demon-
strate the existence in their territory of a functioning market economy, their
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU,
[fn omitted], the Lisbon version of Art. 49 TEU . . . goes a long way to consolidating past routines [fn
omitted]’ (see Hillion (n 34) 212).
36 Eligibility is now subject to the values referred in Art. 2 TEU, which candidate countries must
‘commit’ to ‘promote’ (see Hillion (n 34) 211–12).
37 See Art. 50 (5) TEU.
38 See for instance C Hillion, ‘Enlargement of the EU: The Discrepancy between Accession
Conditionality and Membership Obligations’ (2004) 27 Fordham International Law Journal 715;
M Cremona, ‘Enlargement and External Policy’ in M Cremona (ed.) The Enlargement of the EU
(OUP, Oxford 2003); P-C Mu¨ller-Graff, ‘Legal Framework for EU–CEEC Relations’ in
M Maresceau (ed.) Enlarging the EU (Longman, London 1997). The same views have been expressed
by European Commission President Barroso in a letter to the Economic Affairs Select Committee of
the House of Lords (see <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeconaf/
152/15207.htm#note133>, last accessed on 6 January 2014) and, more recently, by European
Council President Van Rompuy at a press conference with Prime Minister Rajoy in Madrid, on
12 December 2013 (see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
140072.pdf> last accessed on 6 January 2014).
39 On the position under PIL, see the discussion under Section B of Part I.
40 These criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened
by the Madrid European Council in 1995 (see <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/
terms/accession-criteria_en.htm., last accessed on 26 August 2013).
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and their ability to take on the EU’s economic and monetary aims (the ‘eco-
nomic criterion’). Finally, applicant states would also need to accept and trans-
pose the acquis.41 It is submitted that the very nature of the Copenhagen criteria
militates against the existence of an automatic right of EU membership for
newly created state entities: ‘new-comers’ would need to demonstrate, to the
satisfaction of their prospective partners, that they fulfil the criteria in question,
which do not, by their very nature, lend themselves to a mere presumption of
compliance. In the case of newly created states, fulfilment of the Copenhagen
criteria would appear all the more relevant than in the case of existing states,
which will have already achieved membership of other international organiza-
tions, and obtained international recognition of their legal status.
In short, our conclusion is that newly created state entities would need to
comply with the normal EU accession conditions and procedure before they can
join the EU: they would, in other words, need to ‘join the queue’ of accession
countries,42 provided they have been granted the status of a candidate country,43
and fulfil the admission criteria. The above conclusion is without prejudice to
the factual possibility of a speedier accession in the case of a newly created state
entity or, in extremis, of a ‘simplified’ accession procedure to reflect the fact that
the newly created state entity is the product of separation from an existing
Member State. These possibilities are examined in subsection (iii).
(iii) A ‘simplified’ accession procedure?
Once a candidate country has satisfied the admission criteria, it is for the
European Council to decide on the opening of accession negotiations with it.
The rationale of accession negotiations is to ensure the smooth integration in the
EU of a prospective Member State, and to avert any negative socio-economic
consequences of enlargement in both the new and the existing Member States.44
The negotiation process is understood to play a central role in ‘the
Europeanisation of the national institutions and administrations of the acceding
countries’, and to form the ‘final stage of a gradual process of preparing their
public administrations to become full players in the multi-level system of EU
41 Although not defined, as such, in the Treaties, the Union acquis has been described more
precisely in the context of enlargement, in particular following the amendment of Art. 49 TEU
by the Amsterdam Treaty (see, for instance, C Delcourt, ‘The acquis communautaire: Has the
Concept had its Day?’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 829, 831). The concept has been
further detailed in explanatory texts relating to the enlargement process, including in the various
Commission’s Opinions on applications for accession to the EU (see, for instance, L Maurer,
‘Negotiations in progress’ in A Ott and K Inglis (eds), Handbook on European Enlargement (TMC
Asser Press, The Hague 2002) 116. For a comprehensive analysis of the Union acquis in the context
of enlargement and EU integration, see Laulhe´ Shaelou (n 13) 20–4; and Tatham (n 2) 131–5.
42 See Weller (n 12) 1.
43 On the determination and application of the political criteria of enlargement, conditionality, and
the procedure for membership see, for instance, Tatham (n 2) 131–4.
44 See P Van Elsuwege, From Soviet Republics to EU Member States (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Leiden 2008) 309–10.
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policy and decision-making’.45 Would the conventional rationale of accession
negotiations also apply to a seceding state entity?
It should first of all be noted that there are a number of issues that seem
unlikely to be settled without prior accession negotiations (for instance, the
votes in the Council that the new member would have, or the number of
seats it would have in the European Parliament). On the other hand, it could
be argued that, having formerly been part of an existing Member State, and
having, as a result, enjoyed the benefits and carried (some of ) the weight of EU
membership, there would be relatively little that a seceding state entity could
hope to learn from a ‘fresh’ EU accession negotiation process. Indeed, in some
instances, the seceding state entity may already have been in the position of a
‘full player . . . in the multi-level system of EU policy- and decision-making’
through sub-national representation and governance.46,47 The national learning
process could therefore be limited when it comes to the 35 negotiation Chapters
of the acquis of common standards of law, institutions, and practice within the
EU, and the same may turn out to be true of the actual duration of the accession
negotiations. It would indeed seem plausible that, compared to the accession
process for other candidate countries, the accession process for a seceding state
entity would prove to be ‘faster and easier’, given the latter’s familiarity with EU
policies, rules, and laws (although much would also depend on the capacity and
efficiency of the newly created state entity’s administration to deal with the large
body of EU acquis). Moreover, presumably for the same reasons, it might be
argued that, albeit mandatory in nature, the accession process for a newly
created state entity could be ‘simplified’, and that ‘special arrangements’ with
it might be possible, with the unanimous support of all other Member States
(including the rump Member State).48 What would ‘simplified’ mean in this
particular context?
45 Ibid 310.
46 The importance of regional and local self-government is acknowledged in Art. 4(2) TEU, which
is to be read in conjunction with the principle of non-involvement of the EU in the internal affairs of
the Member States, also enshrined in the same Treaty provision (see Matas et al (n 33), 48).
47 The ‘new dynamics’ in Member States’ governance illustrated by regions and local self-
governments is also reflected in other provisions of the EU Treaties, including at the institutional
level. For Spain’s representation at the European Parliament see <http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/meps/en/search.html?country=ES> where members of the various Catalan political parties sit
as MEPs; for Scotland’s representation at the European Parliament see <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/meps/en/search.html?country=GB>; see also the Committee of the Regions, where
Catalonia is represented by its President and Scotland by members of its parliament as well as by
one member of the Scottish Borders Council <http://memberspage.cor.europa.eu/
SearchByCountry.aspx>, all last accessed on 26 August 2013).
48 The rump Member State would obviously have the option to veto the EU accession of the
seceding state entity (see Happold (n 5), 33–4). A consensus between the rump Member State and
the new State entity would need to be found in order for the accession process to proceed. It is telling
that, referring to Scotland, Crawford and Boyle have argued that its position within the EU ‘is likely
to be shaped more by any agreements between the parties than by pre-existing principles of EU law’
(see Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 68). In this regard, also see the Agreement between the UK gov-
ernment and the Scottish government on a referendum on independence for Scotland, 15 October
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Post-Treaty of Lisbon, it might be argued that the accession procedure could
be adjusted within the fabric of Article 49 TEU.49 In particular, revised Article
49 TEU provides that, ‘[t]he conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the
European Council shall be taken into account’ (emphasis added). Inherent in
the above formulation is the power of the European Council to adjust the
enlargement procedure, beyond the boundaries of Article 48 TEU.50 So far it
has been possible to proceed with adjustments with regard to EU membership
both ex ante (during the pre-accession strategy in particular) and ex post,51 in
continuation of the post-accession conditionality policy, as illustrated in the case
of the 2004 enlargement.52 The latter type of adaptations to the Treaties have
been said to provide a degree of flexibility within the EU legal order, despite the
fact that the basic constitutional framework of European integration must, in
principle, be accepted and implemented by all prospective members in the same
way.53 Post-Treaty of Lisbon, and given the powers seemingly granted to the
European Council under Article 49 TEU, the question arises what type of
adjustments to the Treaties would be covered,54 and whether a ‘simplified’
accession process would represent a permissible adjustment, within the meaning
of Article 49 TEU.
In the authors’ opinion, the term ‘simplified’ should in this particular context
be understood to mean a ‘bilaterally negotiated process leading to accession’,
with the term ‘accession’ standing for full EU membership, rather than for any
another type of special relationship as an alternative to EU membership.55
Moreover, any ‘simplified’ accession process, whatever its form and details,
2012, <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independ
ence> last accessed on 26 August 2013.
49 According to a commentator, the Treaty of Lisbon ‘codifies the European Council’s ability to
adjust the enlargement procedure’ (Hillion (n 34) 212). The exercise of this power would inevitably
raise proportionality issues (see Tridimas (n 34) 193).
50 Hillion (n 34) 212. For an illustration of this power before its formalization by the Treaty of
Lisbon, see Laulhe´ Shaelou (n 13) 45–51 and 180, with respect to the 2002 Copenhagen summit and
the 2004 enlargement process.
51 Mu¨ller-Graff (n 38) 39.
52 See, for instance, K Inglis, ‘The Pre-accession Strategy and the Accession Partnerships’ in Ott and
Inglis (n 41); M Cremona (ed.) The Enlargement of the EU (OUP, Oxford 2003); C Hillion, ‘The EU
is Dead. Long Live the EU . . . A Commentary on the Treaty of Accession 2003’ (2004) 29(5) EL Rev
588; and C Hillion (ed.), EU Enlargement, a Legal Approach (Hart, Oxford 2004).
53 Mu¨ller-Graff (n 38) 36.
54 It is reasonable to assume that the ‘hard core’ of EU law (touching upon the fundamental
principles and constitutional foundations of the EU), would not fall under the European
Council’s competence formalized in Art. 49 TEU.
55 With reference to the different ‘modes of adjustment’ of a candidate state ‘to the status and the
dynamics of integration’, as identified by Mu¨ller-Graff, there are three main modes, the strongest one
being full membership, the second being ‘the association of non-member states within a member-like
relations, and the third being various sorts of partial integration’ (Mu¨ller-Graff (ed.), East Central
Europe and the EU: from Europe Agreements to a Member Status (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1997), 39.
Also see A Lazowski, ‘Enhanced Multilateralism and Enhanced Bilateralism: Integration without
Membership in the EU’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1433; and A Evans, The Integration
of the EC and Third States in Europe (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996).
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would (a) require the unanimous consent of all Member States, in accordance
with Art. 49 TEU, and (b) derive from the accession process itself rather than
being a pre-condition for the opening of such a process. This last argument, it is
submitted, takes the analysis further away from other potential sources of com-
parison such as Germany’s situation upon reunification, where the absorption of
former East Germany by the Federal Republic of Germany occurred without
any need for accession negotiations.56 It could be argued that the German case
was the result of a conditional process aiming at the reunification of the country,
distinct from an enlargement process.57 The German example is therefore to be
distinguished from the situation under consideration in this paper, which in-
volves a state entity created through its separation from one of the existing
Member States but willing to be part of the EU. Such a newly created state
entity would need to undergo an accession process proper as opposed to merely
requiring Treaty adjustments to facilitate its accession58. Finally, in the opinion
of the authors, no ‘simplified’ accession process could ever result from the
triggering of a ‘passerelle clause’, whereby simplified rules would apply, as distinct
from the ordinary (general) rules.59
56 See, for instance, F Scharpf, ‘The joint-decision trap: lessons from German Federalism and
European integration’ (1988) 66 Public Administration 239; see also AS Krossa, ‘Integration of
Unequal Units: Comparing the German and the European Unification Process’ (2007) 3(1) Journal
of Contemporary European Research 1; and M Gruel-Dieude´, Chypre et l’UE: mutations diplomat-
iques et politiques (L’Harmattan, Paris 2007), 136–47.
57 In an application of the presumption of state continuity, the La¨nder of the former German
Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990, by virtue of
Art. 23 of the Basic Law of the FRG. As a result, EU law became applicable in the former GDR and
the Council merely adopted a package of adjusting and transitional measures to deal with the impact
of the German reunification (see ‘Package of measures proposed by the Commission for the German
reunification’ COM(90) 400 final (1990) 4 EC, adopted by the Council [1990] OJ L 353/1,
17 December 1990; see also D Spence, ‘Enlargement without Accession: the EC’s Response to
German Unification’, Discussion Paper 36, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,
1991, 17; and Laulhe´ Shaelou (n 13) 176 and 242). No Treaty revision was therefore necessary in the
German case.
58 Originally, Treaty adjustments were meant to address changes ‘closely connected to an individual
State’: institutional changes, official language, territorial scope of the Treaties. The definition of the
term ‘adjustments’ has arguably become broader over time, to encompass changes not ‘intrinsically’
connected to enlargement but ‘politically convenient’, hence the need to address these in an enlarge-
ment process, for fear of ‘smuggling in’ Treaty amendments on the occasion of a forthcoming
enlargement (see B De Witte, ‘Treaty Revision Procedures after Lisbon’ in A Biondi et al (eds),
EU Law after Lisbon (OUP, Oxford 2012) 125). De Witte refers to the European Council’s decision
taken on 18–9 June 2009 (Presidency Conclusions, para. 5(iv), available at<http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf>, last accessed on 26 August 2013),
which arguably ‘endorsed’ this wider reading of the term ‘adjustments’ by agreeing that the Decision
on Ireland ‘would be elevated to the status of Treaty Protocol on the occasion of the first accession of a
new Member State’ (ibid 116 and 125). See also Peers (n 11) 17 and fn 5, 28.
59 With respect to overseas and other semi-autonomous territories of Member States, ordinary
Treaty amendment procedures contained in Art. 48(2)–(5) TEU or the simplified procedures out-
lined in Art. 48(6)–(7) TEU would not apply to amending the status of the Danish, French, and
Netherlands territories (OCTs and ORs) but Art. 355(6) TFEU would. This provision sets out the
possibility for a simplified status change (‘passerelle clause’) and, as such, constitutes a derogation
from the general rules on Treaty revision (see Kochenov (n 27) 61). For a detailed legal analysis of
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One of the key aspects of a ‘simplified’ accession process would be the aspect
of timing. It is clear that there can be no pre-determined timeframe in an
accession process, which can go on for as long as necessary to achieve results,60
and may even extend beyond a new Member State’s actual accession (for in-
stance, where long transitional periods or safeguard clauses are at play).61
Having said that, applying by analogy the spirit of Article 50 TEU,62 it could
be argued that the period of time63 indicated in that provision for the negoti-
ation of a Member State’s withdrawal from the EU64 could also apply to the
accession process of a newly created state entity, within the meaning of this
paper, in order to compensate for the potentially little ‘added-value’ of its
accession process.65 From the timing point of view, ‘simplified’ would mean
accelerated or expedited, but without touching upon the substance of the acces-
sion process, which would remain intact and whose outcome would still have to
be the product of negotiations, including over non-legal issues.66
passerelle clauses in the Treaties, including the ‘general passerelle’ under Art. 48(7) TEU and ‘passerelles
spe´ciales’ see De Witte (n 58) 123. For a critical analysis of Art. 48(6) TEU, see De Witte (n 58)
124–5; and, more generally, Peers (n 11) 32–42.
60 The obvious example would be Turkey’s accession process, which is the longest, so far, of all
accession processes, and which remains suspended and incomplete to date (see Laulhe´ Shaelou (n 13)
44–5; and Tatham (n 2) 133 and 137). There can also be procedural and substantive barriers
hampering good and prompt progress towards accession, inherent in Art. 49 TEU itself, especially
post-Lisbon (eg the reference in it to Art. 2 TEU and to the promotion of the Union’s values,
parliamentary participation through their ‘notification’ of an application for membership)—see
Tatham (n 2) 135–6).
61 See Tatham (n 2) 137 and fn 57 with respect to the 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession.
62 Despite their different scope, which means that Articles 49 and 50 TEU cannot ‘be regarded
simply as the obverse and reverse of the same coin’ (Tatham (n 2) 128), these two provisions are
linked to one other (it is no coincidence that these two provisions follow one another in the final
provisions of the TEU).
63 It should be noted that the same two-year period also appears in Art. 48(5) TEU with respect to
the ordinary revision procedure, in the event that the ratification process runs into difficulties in one
or more Member States.
64 Art. 50(3) TEU. Unlike in the case of the activation of the exit clause, the EU accession of a
newly created state entity could not be deemed to have occurred upon the expiry of a specific period
of time (hence the absence of any express reference to a timeframe in Art. 49 TEU, unlike in the case
of Arts 48 and 50 TEU).
65 This may not be true of a new state entity having gained independence from a Member State
benefiting from specific opt-outs in key EU policy areas, as in the case of the UK (which has
negotiated opt-outs from the single currency as well as from cooperation in justice and home affairs).
66 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore such considerations, the costs of which may be a
determining factor, as they are likely to be high. In the case of Scotland see G Avery, ‘The Foreign
Policy Implications of and for a Separate Scotland’, available at <http://www.publications.parlia
ment.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/643/m05.htm>; ‘Scottish Independence and the
EU—a Poor Fit’, available at <http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/print-article.asp?id=2387>;
D Furby, ‘Scottish Independence and EU Accession’ (Business for New Europe, 2012) <http://
www.bnegroup.org/images/uploads/publications/files/In_Depth_Scottish_Independence_and_
EU_Accession_-_BNE_March_2012_1.pdf>; and A Thorp and G Thomson, ‘Scotland,
Independence and the EU’ (Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/6110, 2011) <http://www.
parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06110>, all last accessed on 26 August 2013).
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Thus, it would appear that, (a) for the reasons set out in subsection (ii), a
newly created state entity, recognized under PIL,67 would need to be the subject
of an accession process in accordance with Article 49 TEU (provided its acces-
sion efforts are not hampered by an existing EU Member State, including
through use of the ‘double’ veto option deriving from Article 49 TEU68),
(b) the accession process for a seceding state entity could nevertheless turn
out to be ‘faster and easier’ than the process for other candidates, and (c) the
accession process could be further accelerated through the negotiation of ad-
justments to the EU Treaties, to be addressed within the fabric of Article 49
TEU.69,70
In light of the above, the only outstanding question would appear to relate to
the acquired rights of the rump Member State (and its (ex) nationals), and their
impact on the debate surrounding the newly created state entity’s rights of
accession to the EU. The issue of acquired rights is examined in the following
subsection.
(iv) The relevance to the debate of acquired rights
Absent an automatic right of accession to the EU enjoyed by a newly created
state entity, and given the presumption of continuity for the (rump) Member
State under PIL,71 the issue of the allocation of acquired rights between the
rump Member State and the newly created state entity would appear straight-
forward: such rights would continue being exercised by the rump Member State
in its new form (even if subject to certain adjustments to reflect the reduction in
its territory and population);72 at the same time, there should, a priori, be no
room for the acquisition or shared enjoyment of such rights by the seceding state
entity,73 which would have to start a fresh process of accession, and negotiate its
67 This aspect would need to be addressed first, as the creation and the existence of a new State
would be a pre-condition for EU accession talks to take place. Contra Matas et al who argue that the
main objective of the exercise would be ‘the modification of the provisions of the Treaties of con-
stitution to adapt to the new situation derived from state succession in case of secession or dissolution
of a member state’ (see Matas et al (n 33) 71–2).
68 At the Council level and subsequently during the process of national ratification—this point is
especially crucial for Member States having their own secessionist movements.
69 For the purposes of this paper, a cursory comparison between the Negotiating Frameworks for
Iceland and Turkey suffices to illustrate the existence of elements of differentiation in EU enlarge-
ment within the scope of Art. 49 TEU, whereby both the EU and Member States need to ‘strike a
balance’ between ‘common core’ and individual criteria for a given applicant country (see Tatham
(n 2) 135). For a socio-legal analysis of the theoretical framework of differentiation with respect to
the 2004 enlargement, see Laulhe´ Shaelou (n 13).
70 The willingness to proceed with such adjustments may, of course, be hampered by the EU’s
disinclination to accelerate the accession process so as to avoid setting a precedent that others may
wish to benefit from (see Furby (n 66) 1).
71 On the position under PIL, see the discussion under Section B of Part I.
72 The reader is referred to the discussion under subsection (i) of Section A of Part I.
73 Contra Avery (n 66) points 14–5.
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own accession terms and conditions.74 This would, in practical terms, entail a
large time gap between the moment when the seceding entity becomes an in-
dependent state under PIL and the moment when the process of its EU acces-
sion is eventually completed. During this period (the length of which cannot be
pre-determined), all of the rights previously enjoyed by the entity (and its
people) at the time that it was still part of a Member State would normally
cease to apply, with no new rights replacing them until the seceding state entity
has joined the EU. As a result, there would inevitably be a vacuum in the
enjoyment by the entity and its people of rights flowing from their former
participation in and membership of the EU.75
Although there could be some room, at least in theory, to support the con-
tinuing application of EU law in the seceding state entity for the interim period
between independence and EU accession,76 it is submitted that nothing short of
negotiations would suffice to determine the extent and terms of the application
of EU law in a newly created state entity during the interim period. The ex-
ample of Algeria, when it gained its independence from France in 1962, could
be of some relevance here,77 to the extent that Algeria’s secession from France
was accompanied by its withdrawal from the European Communities (EC) but,
also, resulted in the continued—albeit limited—application of EC law in
Algerian territory.78 Algeria’s withdrawal from the EC was not addressed ex-
pressly during the bilateral negotiations that led to Algerian independence.
However, following Algerian independence, the Algerian President requested
from the Council the ‘maintenance’ (or retention) of the application of certain
Treaty provisions, ‘pending future definition of EC–Algeria relations’.79 This
appears to imply that during the period between Algeria’s declaration of inde-
pendence (on 1 July 1962) and its request for the continuing application to it of
certain Treaty provisions (on 24 December 1962)—and arguably even beyond,
at least until consideration of the request by the Community institutions—such
provisions of EU law as may have continued to apply to Algeria only did so
‘tacitly’ and ‘by implication’, and ‘without any official overtures either from that
74 In particular, it is clear that any ‘opt-outs’ available to the rump Member State would not apply
mutatis mutandis to the seceding State entity, which would need to negotiate transitional measures,
safeguard clauses or other types of measures, prima facie temporary in nature, both with the EU and
with other Member States (see Laulhe´-Shaelou (n 13), 98–9).
75 This is also true of Member States’ obligations deriving from the EU Treaties, as there will be at
first no state entity in international law and, subsequently, no obligations under EU law on the newly
created state entity as a ‘third country’.
76 Arguments in favour of the continuing application of EU law in the seceding state entity for the
interim period could in particular be derived from considerations of legal certainty, legitimate
expectations and, possibly, equal treatment as per Art. 4(2) TEU (see Peers (n 11), 60 and fn 251).
77 See Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 99.
78 Algeria was subject to the Treaty provisions under Art. 227(2) EEC (inter alia on free movement
of goods, agriculture, liberalization of services, competition, and institutions—see Tatham (n 2) 144
and fns 103 and 104).
79 Ibid 144; also see P Tavernier, ‘Aspects juridiques des relations e´conomiques entre la CEE
et l’Alge´rie’ (1972) 8 Revue trimestrielle de droit europe´en 1, 9–10.
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state or the Community’.80 While receipt of the request was acknowledged by
the Council in January 1963, and was assessed positively by the Commission,81
it is unclear whether the relevant Treaty provisions continued to apply until the
conclusion of the first EC–Algeria bilateral agreement in 1976.82 Algeria not
being a European state, and having initially been subject to a special regime, it
was obvious that, in the absence of a framework for the ‘soft’ application to it of
the relevant EC rules, all benefits derived from its former EC membership
would have been lost, at least until a bilateral agreement on the relations be-
tween the EC and Algeria had been reached.83 Drawing on the example of
Algeria, we conclude that the continuing application of EU law in a newly
created state entity would need to be expressly addressed in the course of bilateral
negotiations taking place during the interim period.84 While the desire to bridge
the gap during the interim period may be understandable, achieving that in
practice appears difficult,85 even through an association agreement characterized
by an ‘intense degree of integration’ and, potentially, including some elements of
continuing application of EU law.86 The newly created state entity could, of
course, decide to maintain, on a voluntary and unilateral basis, the application
of certain EU law provisions: this, however, would not cause the new state entity
or its people to retain any rights or obligations under the Treaties, which would
be dependent upon full membership.87
The vacuum created during the interim period in the enjoyment of the rights
deriving from EU membership would have implications not only for the newly
created state entity but, also, for its subjects.88 Secession arguably leads to a
fundamental change in the collective status of the nationals of a newly created
80 See Tatham (n 2) 150.
81 ‘Assuring the Community’s respect for former responsibilities, especially in financial matters’,
see Tatham (n 2) 144 and fnn 110 and 111.
82 As a commentator has aptly argued, there were signs in the relationship between Algeria and the
EU that ‘neither side wished to see a sudden and complete rupture between them, and they thus
allowed an intermediate legal situation to continue due to important political and economic con-
siderations, especially in relation to France’ (see Tatham (n 2) 145).
83 EEC–Algeria Cooperation Agreement, 26 April 1976 [1978] OJ L 263/2. The reference to
Algeria in the Treaties was subsequently deleted by the Maastricht Treaty; see Peers (n 11), 58.
84 For the possibility of negotiations ‘by analogy with the position of withdrawing Member States’
in the period between the recognition of the secession of the entity concerned and the official date of
such secession, see Peers (n 11), 60. Such negotiations would, however, need to remain informal, as
the EU can only negotiate with a state recognized as such under PIL. As previously indicated it is
logical that, for practical reasons, Member States may prefer to negotiate and adopt one set of
measures combining various forms of Treaty amendment, if needed, rather than be involved in
distinct negotiation processes to address the situation of the seceding State entity and/or of the
rump Member State.
85 See Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 103.
86 See Peers (n 11) 62.
87 See Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 103.
88 See in this respect a parliamentary question to the Commission by Mara Bizzotto about the
possibility of secession in a Member State and the impact on citizens, 25 July 2012, available at
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2012–007453&lan
guage=EN>, as well as the answer from the Commission given by European Commission President
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state entity, who would normally (even if not necessarily) lose the nationality of
the predecessor Member State and, by implication, also the right to enjoy the
benefits of EU Citizenship.89 Since EU citizenship is ‘contingent’ upon its
beneficiary’s possession of the nationality of one, at least, of the Member
States,90 the citizens of a newly created state entity would not fall within the
scope of the Treaties pending EU accession, leading to their material incapacity
to enjoy, during the interim period, the individual rights and benefits deriving
from EU Citizenship.91 In any given legal order, the exercise of acquired rights
accruing to individuals normally depends upon national-level decisions, con-
firming the link between individual rights (including rights of citizenship) and
the state. Specifically in the case of the EU legal order, the above statement may
call for some qualification to the extent that an additional layer of rights and
entitlements exists, granted to individuals at the supranational level and deriving
from EU law.92 Thus, where state decisions have a direct, negative impact on the
enjoyment of those very individual rights derived from EU law93—as in the
scenario that is the focus of this paper, where EU law-derived legal rights would
Barroso, 28 August 2012, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.
do?reference=E-2012–007453&language=EN>, both last accessed on 29 August 2013.
89 Art. 20(1) TFEU clearly provides that EU citizenship is ‘additional’ to national citizenship (see
P Craig and G De Bu´rca, EU Law (5th edn OUP, Oxford 2011) 821. Before the term ‘additional’
was inserted into the TEU by the Treaty of Lisbon, the nature of the relationship between national
and EU Citizenship had already evolved through the case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU), leading, according to a commentator, to the gradual—but still relative and limited—
absorption of national citizenship within Union citizenship (G Davies, ‘The Entirely Conventional
Supremacy of Union Citizenship and Rights’ in J Shaw (ed.) ‘Has the ECJ Challenged Member State
Sovereignty in Nationality Law?’ EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2011/62, 5 available at <http://
eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/RSCAS_2011_62.pdf> last accessed 26.08.2013. Davies talks about ‘citi-
zenship pluralism’ in order to describe the relationship between the national and the EU level of
citizenship, both levels being ‘intertwined in a mutually dependent way, neither able to develop
without taking account of the other’ (ibid 9). Kostakopoulou points to their interaction, ‘without
affirming an explicit or implicit hierarchy of statuses’ (D Kostakopoulou, ‘EU Citizenship and
Member State Nationality: Updating or Upgrading the Link’ in the same volume, 21).
90 See Craig and De Bu´rca (n 89) 821. This is so despite efforts during the Convention on the
Future of Europe to ‘de-link’ EU citizenship from the nationality of Member States, linking it, rather,
to stable residence in the EU. For more details see <http://european-convention.eu.int/>, last
accessed on 29 August 2013. With respect to this debate in the context of the Treaty of Lisbon,
see N Reich, ‘The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an enlarged
Union’ (2005) European Law Journal 11; and Van Elsuwege (n 44) 448–9. Kochenov describes
the relationship between the two legal statuses as being ‘connected through acquisition: enjoying one
is a precondition to possessing another’ (Kochenov, ‘Two Sovereign States vs. a Human Being: CJEU
as a Guardian of Arbitrariness In Citizenship Matters’ in J Shaw J (ed.) ‘Has the ECJ Challenged
Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law?’ EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2011/62, 11–5, 12.
The recently announced plans of the Maltese authorities to sell Maltese passports to wealthy non-EU
nationals, allowing them to become established across the EU, is telling of the lingering perception of
nationality law as an issue of domestic interest, despite its immediate link to EU citizenship.
91 As set out in Art. 21(2) TFEU and interpreted by the CJEU in its case law; see eg Craig and De
Bu´rca (n 89) 820–53.
92 Through the status of EU Citizenship in particular, as recognized by the CJEU in its case law.
93 See Davies (n 89) 6.
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automatically cease to apply in the seceding state entity’s territory following a
change of sovereignty94,95—one may want to query whether it might be possible
to differentiate between the territorial scope of application of EU law deriving
from EU membership (which will have been lost automatically upon secession)
and its personal scope of application to individuals settled within the seceding
territory (which may need to ‘survive’ secession in some respects, if individual
rights are to be protected). It would, after all, only be reasonable to expect the
fact that certain individuals were formerly EU citizens to be something that
cannot be ignored, if those individuals are not to be deprived, through the
(unilateral) act of secession, of rights that accrued to them personally under
the status quo ante.96
In the light of the above, the question arises what the nature and scope of the
proposed continuing application ratione personae of EU law may be in the
scenario that is the focus of this paper.97 This question is addressed in subsection
(v), with an emphasis on the right of EU Citizenship.
94 See Matas et al (n 33) 41 and 47.
95 It is argued that this would not amount to a ‘wholly internal situation’ escaping the reach of EU
law, in line with the Court’s case law on ‘sub-State’ entities such as autonomous regions or territories
of Member States. For an example, see Case C-212/06, Government of the French Community and
Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] ECR I-1683, paras 38–40. For other cases of
relevance to ‘sub-State’ entities, see Case C-428/07, The Queen, on the application of Mark Horvath v
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2009] ECR I-6355 as well as the Azores and
Basque Country tax cases between 2006 and 2008. Also see D Edward and J Bengoetxea, ‘The Status
and Rights of Sub-state Entities in the Constitutional Order of the EU’ in Arnull et al, A
Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart, Oxford
2011) 35–7.
96 The implications of the collective withdrawal of the substance of EU citizenship rights from
(former) nationals of a Member State come to light in particular in the context of overseas territories
if one considers that the EU Treaties do not make any connection between the acquisition or the loss
of the status of EU citizenship and the place of residence (see Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger
[2006] ECR I-8055, paras 29–31). The Court clarified in this case that the internal movement
between the territories of a Member State lying ‘within and outwith’ the territorial scope of EU law
does not result in the loss of EU citizenship (paras 29–31; see Kochenov (n 27) 205). Such a move
could, however, affect the legal status of the Union citizen as far as the enjoyment of rights is
concerned. After this case and as argued by Kochenov, ‘it is abundantly clear that the ability of
the Member States to deprive their nationals of EU citizenship through legal constructions built
around the concept of residence is very limited indeed’, even if it remains a possibility (Kochenov
(n 27)205). It is only natural after all that the limited scope of EU law, in space in particular, carries
with it some adverse implications, including on the extent of EU citizenship rights (free movement
provisions, political rights but also the principle of non-discrimination) and their exercise (see
Kochenov (n 27) in and/or out of the EU territory, 215–19), as appears to be the case in the scenario
under study in this paper.
97 On the different scope ratione loci, ratione materiae, and ratione personae of EU law and the
Member States’ room for manoeuvre to decide who is an EU citizen and what the ius tractum nature
of EU citizenship is, see Kochenov (n 27); also see D Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces:
European Citizenship and a Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’ (2009) 15(2)
Columbia Journal of European Law 169.
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(v) EU Citizenship, fundamental rights, and state secession
Although EU law does not regulate the conditions for the conferral, by the
Member States, of nationality (on which EU Citizenship is conditional),98 it
follows from the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that national
citizenship law is not entirely independent of EU law, and should respect its
principles to the extent that it can have an impact on the enjoyment by indi-
viduals of their EU law-derived rights.99
With its rulings in Micheletti,100 Garcia Avello,101 and, more recently,
Rottmann,102 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has estab-
lished a link between national citizenship and EU law. In particular, the CJEU
has ruled that, ‘EU citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of
Member State nationals, enabling those who find themselves in the same situ-
ation to enjoy within the scope of the Treaty the same treatment in law irre-
spective of their nationality . . .’103 In its rulings, the CJEU has also provided
guidance on which aspects of national citizenship law may fall under its juris-
diction. While it has been suggested that all aspects of citizenship law should,
eventually, fall within the scope of EU law, to the extent that they impact upon
the ability of individuals to enjoy their EU Citizenship rights,104 this remains,
for the time being, no more than an aspiration as the CJEU’s ruling in Rottmann
demonstrates.105
Rottmann offers interesting insights into the world of deprivation of rights
deriving from EU Citizenship as a result of the stripping of nationality. The
Court considered the notion of statelessness in the EU legal order with reference
to international law,106 confirming that the proviso initially formulated in para-
graph 10 of Micheletti that ‘due regard’ must be paid by Member States to EU
98 Declaration No 2 on Nationality of a Member State appended to the Maastricht Treaty clearly
states that the question of nationality is determined by reference to national law.
99 A detailed account of the Court’s case law on EU citizenship lies outside the scope of this paper.
For an account of the relevant case law see, generally, J Shaw (ed), ‘Has the ECJ Challenged Member
State Sovereignty in Nationality Law’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2011/62; Craig and De Burca
(n 89) 820–53; and Davies (n 89).
100 Case C-369/90 Micheletti v Delegacio´n del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239.
101 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-1163.
102 Case C-135/08 Rottmann v Freistadt Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449.
103 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31.
104 See Davies (n 89), 8.
105 See O Golynker, ‘The correlation between the status of Union citizenship, the rights attached to
it and nationality in Rottmann’ in J Shaw (ed), ‘Has the ECJ Challenged Member State Sovereignty
in Nationality Law?,’EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2011/62, 19.
106 The reference is to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the European Convention
on Nationality, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (see Rottmann (n 102) paras 52–3).
On the attribution of nationality of the successor state in accordance with the International Law
Commission’s Articles on the Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States,
see Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 104–5. Also see A Abat, ‘Catalan Internal Enlargement’, NEEWS
(New Emerging European Western States) available at <http://www.international-view.cat/PDF/
civ%207/CIV%207%20Antoni%20Abat.pdf> last accessed on 29 August 2013.
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law when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality is without preju-
dice to the firmly established principle of international law that Member States
have the power to lay down rules governing the acquisition and loss of nation-
ality.107 The Court has since been criticized for not going far enough to ensure
the autonomy of EU law vis-a`-vis international law in this respect, and for
failing to introduce a sufficient degree of predictability in the interaction be-
tween national and EU law on the issue of nationality.108 However, following
the Court’s ruling in Rottmann, it has at least become clear that the revocation
and/or withdrawal of EU Citizenship (as opposed to its initial granting)109 are
matters of interest to EU law, to the extent that the act of taking away an
individual’s nationality deprives that individual of the status of an EU citizen
and of the benefits attaching thereto (inter alia the rights to free movement,
establishment, and equal treatment).110 Rottmann has also been criticized for
leaving the application of the principle of proportionality (a necessary safeguard
to ensure that national authorities pay ‘due regard’ to EU law and to the con-
sequences of their actions for the person concerned under EU law when exercis-
ing their powers in the sphere of nationality) to the discretion of the national
courts,111 despite regarding the deprivation of rights deriving from the EU
Citizenship as matters of supranational interest.112 Perhaps more crucially for
the purposes of this paper, Rottmann suggests that, de lege lata, EU Citizenship is
not (yet) an autonomous fundamental right, and that it may be some time
107 Rottmann (n 102) paras 39, 45, and 48.
108 The CJEU’s approach in Rottmann diverged from the approach taken in Micheletti, where the
Court dismissed a ‘potentially harmful’ rule of international law in favour of a solution better
adapted to the specificities of the EU legal order (see Kochenov (n 90) 12–14. Rottmann also sits
uncomfortably with the Court’s ruling in Kadi where the Court showed its willingness to provide
clear and legitimate fundamental rights safeguards through a full and rigorous judicial review of the
lawfulness of all EU acts, including those designed to implement UN Security Council resolutions:
adopting a ‘constitutionalist’ approach to the protection of fundamental rights, the Court showed
that it would only consider compliance with international obligations if they were ‘harmonious’ with
the general principles of ‘fundamental rights norms’ as developed in its case law (Joined Cases C-402/
05P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the
European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 326). The
CJEU appears to have just confirmed and reinforced its constitutionalist approach in Kadi II (see
Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, Commission, Council, UK v Yassin Abdullah
Kadi, 18 July 2013, not yet reported).
109 In Rottmann, the Court distinguished the situation of the applicant to that of the applicant in
Kaur (Case C-192/99, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Manjit Kaur,
intervener: Justice [2001] ECR I-1237), where a third country national did not meet the definition of
a national of a given Member State and could not therefore as such be deprived of the rights deriving
from the status of Union citizen, which he had never enjoyed in the first place (Rottmann (n 102)
para. 49).
110 A commentator has drawn attention to an apparent separation between the rules of acquisition
of citizenship, which remain at the national level, and those on its loss, which have partly moved to
the supranational level following Rottmann, an ‘untenable half-way solution’ where the EU and
national statuses ‘are separated in terms of rights, but their acquisition and loss are not’ (Kochenov
(n 90) 12–13).
111 See Rottmann (n 102) para. 55.
112 See Kochenov (n 90) 12 and 14.
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before it attains this status.113 However, it has been suggested that, following
Rottmann, the loss of the nationality of a Member State would not, for all
intents and purposes, place an individual ‘outside the scope of EU law’: loss
of nationality is, instead, ‘a restriction on the rights associated with EU
Citizenship’, which would justify ‘personal circumstances scrutiny’ under the
Treaties ‘before it can validly take effect’.114
Coming back to the scenario that is the focus of this paper, the issue of the
continuing enjoyment, by (some of) the newly created state entity’s nationals, of
(some of) the benefits attaching to the nationality of the rump Member State
could, of course, be the object of a bilateral agreement between the rump
Member State and the seceding State entity. However, such a bilateral agreement
could never have the effect of offering to all nationals of the seceding state entity
the continuing enjoyment of rights arising under EU citizenship (eg through
conferral to them of the rump Member State’s nationality) if the impact of
secession is not to be negated. The following question therefore arises: would it
be legitimate for the nationals of a newly created state entity to expect to be able
to rely automatically, in their capacity as (former) EU citizens, on (some of) the
constitutional attributes115 and/or rights of ‘elevated’ importance116 attaching to
EU Citizenship,117 or to expect that their former status is, at least, taken into
account, in the interim period between secession and EU accession, to facilitate
their enjoyment of the rights attaching to EU citizenship?
What is worth noting from the outset is that there are three fundamental
differences between the scenario in Rottmann and the secession scenario that is
the focus of this paper. The first difference is that, applied to a secession scen-
ario, the proportionality test in Rottmann would take on a collective dimension.
While there is no reason, whether in logic or in law, why the withdrawal,
through a sovereign act, of EU Citizenship rights affecting an entire collectivity
should not be a matter of at least equal supranational interest to the withdrawal
113 In his opinion in Rottmann, Advocate General Maduro opined that, ‘[A]ny attempt at an answer
presupposes a sound understanding of the relationship between the nationality of a Member State
and Union citizenship. These are two concepts which are both inextricably linked and independent
[fn omitted]. Union citizenship assumes nationality of a Member State but it is also a legal and
political concept independent of that of nationality’ (para. 23). Also see Kochenov (n 27) 203.
114 See M Dougan, ‘Some Comment on Rottmann and the ‘Personal Circumstances’ Assessment in
the Union Citizenship Case Law’ in J Shaw (ed.) ‘Has the ECJ Challenged Member State Sovereignty
in Nationality Law?’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2011/62, 17.
115 As set out inter alia in Kadi (n 108) paras 284–6, 303–6, 317, and 322.
116 Golynker (n 105) 19.
117 Given the current status of EU Citizenship, reliance on it may in any event be less beneficial to a
party seeking to maintain access to certain rights or benefits compared to reliance on another eco-
nomic status (see Craig and De Bu`rca (n 89) 847). One may, for instance, take the example of an EU
citizen who has acquired a right of permanent residence in another Member State prior to secession
affecting its territory, of the autonomous economic rights derived from Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, and
of the political rights granted under Articles 22 to 25 TFEU (see Craig and De Bu`rca (n 89),
848–50).
Athanassiou and Shaelou22
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2014
http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
of the rights of particular individuals,118 the proportionality exercise would
clearly differ in a secession scenario, by involving a balancing act between
national sovereignty, on the one hand (expressed through a deliberate act of
secession, no less), and the collective interest of individuals on the other, to
determine where the public interest lies. A second difference is that, in a seces-
sion scenario, the proportionality test would not be applied against the back-
ground of the adverse consequences of statelessness: in this respect, the
proportionality test would be less demanding, hence easier for the national
authorities to satisfy. A third difference is that, in Rottmann, the applicant’s
claim was against the Member State, and its decision to strip the applicant of
his nationality, whereas in a secession scenario the claim would presumably
(also) lie against the EU. These differences would appear to preclude a mutatis
mutandis application of Rottmann to the secession scenario that is the focus of
this paper.
To help establish what the extent of the legitimate expectations of the na-
tionals of a newly created state entity might be, and whether the need to protect
the enjoyment of rights associated with EU Citizenship could provide the basis
for a claim to the continuing enjoyment ratione personae of certain rights by the
nationals of a newly created state entity despite the absence of any right of
automatic accession of the seceding state entity to the EU, it is useful to refer
to the practice on the protection of fundamental human rights under the
European Convention on Human Rights (the ‘ECHR’ or ‘the Convention’)
in cases of secession. Ruling on the basis of the ‘practical requirements’ of Article
46 ECHR, and of the ‘principle that fundamental rights protected by interna-
tional human rights treaties should indeed belong to individuals living in the
territory of the State party concerned, notwithstanding its subsequent dissolution
or succession (emphasis added) . . .’, the European Court of Human Rights
(EctHR) has found that the Convention should be deemed ‘as having continu-
ously been in force’ in Montenegro despite its independence from Serbia and
during the time span until it joined the Council of Europe.119 For the purpose
of a comparative analysis, and in so far as membership of international organ-
izations, on the one hand, and fundamental rights protection, on the other, are
concerned, it is worth recalling that membership of the Council of Europe and
of the Convention are separate issues. However, it remains the case that no state
can become a member of the Council of Europe without also becoming a sig-
natory to the ECHR. This should be read in conjunction with the ECtHR’s
118 See A O’Neill, ‘A quarrel in a faraway country? Scotland, Independence and the EU’, available at
<http://eutopialaw.com/2011/11/14/685> last accessed on 26 August 2013.
119 Bijelic v Montenegro and Serbia (Application 11890/05, 28 April 2009, ECtHR), paras 67–9;
also see Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 95–8. The case was originally brought against Serbia-
Montenegro and then against Montenegro and Serbia separately. Montenegro joined the Council
of Europe as a new state on 11 May 2007, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Statute of the Council of
Europe, whereas the Republic of Serbia continued the membership of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Council of Europe.
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finding, above, that a state can become a party to the ECHR through succession
(although there is no express provision in the Convention to that effect), result-
ing in the continuous application of the Convention’s provisions pending an
invitation for the seceding state entity to join the Council of Europe.120
Without prejudice to the insights that the above comparison provides, the
substantial differences in the accession procedure and membership between
the Council of Europe and the EU121 would seem to preclude the drawing
of any direct analogy of relevance to the scenario under consideration in this
paper.
The example of the Baltic States is also instructive (although theirs was nei-
ther a case of state succession nor secession but, rather, of state continuity).122 In
the case of the Baltic States, state continuity entailed a restoration of pre-war
citizenship legislation, which had been ‘suspended’ during the period of Soviet
rule. In addition to those who fulfilled the requirements of the pre-war citizen-
ship legislation, ‘automatic’ citizenship was only granted to a limited number of
other residents (the legislation in question was later amended in view of EU
accession, but only to an extent: citizenship rights did not extend fully to
Russian-speaking and other ‘stateless’ residents of these countries).123 As a
matter of international law, the better view is that the principle of continuity
does not imply a right of citizenship for immigrant population, hence the ex-
istence of ‘non-citizens’ in the Baltic States.124,125 However limited its applica-
tion to the scenario under consideration in this paper and to our examination of
the possibility of a claim to the continuing application of EU citizenship rights
for the benefit of the inhabitants of a seceding state entity, the example of the
Baltic States confirms that, ‘there is no uniform set of rules regarding the
granting of citizenship after the restoration of independence’.126
In conclusion, it appears that, in a secession scenario, the enjoyment by the
inhabitants of the newly created state entity of EU Citizenship rights cannot be
120 See Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 95–8.
121 Membership of the Council of Europe is upon invitation by the Committee of Ministers (Art. 4
of the Statute of the Council of Europe) following satisfaction of the conditions set out in Art. 3 of
the Statute. It is, therefore, quite different from accession to the EU, on the basis of Art. 49 TEU
(which is a process based on conditionality and negotiations).
122 The Baltic States were recognized on the basis of State continuity as the Soviet period of occu-
pation was deemed illegal and as such was null and void; see Van Elsuwege (n 44) 59–85.
123 Ibid 69–79.
124 Ibid 75.
125 With EU accession, the status quo has nevertheless become harder to reconcile with the pro-
tection of fundamental principles of non-discrimination, free movement and EU citizenship under
the EU Treaties, as interpreted by the Court in its case law. In this regard see, for instance, P Van
Elsuwege, ‘Russian-speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems of Integration at the
Threshold of the EU’, ECMI Working Papers, 20/2004, 53–7; see also Van Elsuwege (n 44)
262–8 on the impact of the EU accession process on the language legislation of the Baltic States.
See more generally F De Varennes, Language, Minorities and Human Rights (Kluwer, The
Netherlands 1996), 246.
126 As quoted in Van Elsuwege (n 44), 78 (fn 361); see alsoibid 269–88.
Athanassiou and Shaelou24
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2014
http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
automatic. The absence of an automatic right to EU Citizenship (the existence
of which would imply the continuing enjoyment of the rights deriving there-
from), does not necessarily mean that, in the interim period between secession
and accession to the EU, the nationals of a newly created state entity would not
have a legitimate expectation to the survival of certain aspects of their former
EU Citizenship rights. What it does, however, mean is that these expectations
can only be given effect through negotiations, involving the rump Member State
and other EU Member States, on the one hand, and the seceding state entity, on
the other, informed by the need to avert some of the adverse consequences, for
individuals, of the act of secession.
B. PIL considerations
Although the EU constitutes a ‘new legal order of international law’ with its own
internal rules,127 the Treaties on which the EU is founded have been negotiated
and concluded in accordance with the general principles of PIL, thereby giving
rise to rights and obligations for the participating Member States enforceable
(also) as a matter of PIL. For the reasons touched on later in this section, there is
a limit to the analogies that can be drawn between the EU and a regular inter-
national organization (and, by extension, to the utility of the lessons drawn from
PIL with regard to the normative treatment of secession within the EU).
However, for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to examine the normative
treatment of the scenario that is the focus of this paper not only from the
perspective of EU law but, also, from that of PIL.
(i) Introductory remarks
The questions addressed in this section are, essentially, questions of ‘state
continuity’ and ‘state succession’,128 areas of great uncertainty and
controversy.129
127 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie des Belastingen [1963] ECR 3: ‘[t]he
European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for benefit of
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subject of
which comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals’.
128 Both the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties (United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1946, 3) and the 1983 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States
in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts (not yet in force at the time of writing) define
‘succession of States’ as the ‘replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the inter-
national relations of territory’ (see Art. 2(1) (b) and Art. 2(1) (a), respectively).
129 See the comment of Germany’s Federal Supreme Court in the Espionage Protection Case that, ‘the
problem of State succession is one of the most disputed areas of international law’ (Case No. 2 BG
38/91, 94 International Law Reports 68, 77–8). In this regard, also see Brownlie (n 20), 650; MP de
Brichambaut et al, Lec¸ons de droit international public (Dalloz, Paris 2002) 68; and MCR Craven,
‘The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law’ (1998) 9
European Journal of International Law 142, 143–4. The authors acknowledge that the concepts
of state continuity and succession are not amenable to precise definition.
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Whether in a concrete factual situation one is faced with a process of seces-
sion, as opposed to dissolution,130 ie whether an existing state co-exists with a
new state entity, even if only as a rump State, or the predecessor state has simply
ceased to exist, is a question to which the answer depends mainly on consider-
ations of customary international law (rather than treaty law), drawn from state
practice and opinio juris (including the opinions of international organizations).
Neither of the two international conventions addressing issues relevant to state
succession appears to reflect state practice in this area.131 Indeed, the relevant
state practice is far from uniform or unambiguous, to the point that settled legal
rules have yet to emerge, even as a matter of customary law (let alone treaty law).
It nevertheless stands to reason that there should be at least a presumption of state
continuity where the rump state involves what may be regarded as fundamen-
tally the same territorial and governmental unit, despite the diminution in its
territory and population resulting from the political events lying at the roots of
its mutation.132 This presumption of continuity would prima facie also be
consistent with the fulfilment of the PIL criteria for statehood, as a condition
precedent to recognition (although some of the confusion in this area would
ultimately appear to arise from conflating the concepts of statehood and recog-
nition with those of continuity and succession).133
(ii) Basic propositions on state continuity and succession drawn from PIL
Despite the absence of clearly settled legal rules, there is something of a con-
sensus around three basic propositions of PIL regarding state continuity and
succession.
The first is that where the political events giving rise to mutations affecting
the territory, population, or system of government of a state do not result in the
extinction of that state, the rump state’s rights and obligations remain un-
affected (including those arising under treaties or attaching to a state’s mem-
bership of international organizations).134 It follows that, in cases of secession
within the meaning of this paper, the coming into being of one or more seceding
state entities does not normally affect the existence of the rump state in the
international stage, nor does it raise issues of state continuity and succession.135
130 As a commentator has aptly observed, ‘[I]n most cases, it is extremely difficult to distinguish
properly between the two classes of case, as, for instance, between a case of multiple succession and
one of dismemberment . . . factually speaking, the processes are similar’ (Craven (n 129), 153).
131 The reference is to the 1978 and to the 1983 Vienna Conventions (see note 128), which
commentators consider to deviate from and to only partially reflect state practice (see, for instance,
P-M Dupuy and Y Kerbrat, Droit international public (Dalloz, Paris 2010) 73–74; Brownlie (n 20)
653 and 662; Brichambaut et al (n 129) 69; Shaw (n 17) 959; and M. Dixon, Textbook on
International Law (3rd edn, Blackstone, London 1996) 73.
132 Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 77–8.
133 The point is aptly made in Craven (n 129), especially 160–1.
134 See, for instance, Crawford and Boyle (n 15), 78–81; Shaw (n 17) 974; and Happold (n 5) 22–8.
135 This proposition is borne out by the examples of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, in 1965,
and West Pakistan’s separation from Pakistan, in 1972 (in both cases, the rump states retained their
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The second proposition is that, where a new state emerges, this ‘will com-
mence international life free from the treaty rights and obligations applicable to
its former sovereign’,136 and will ‘not [be] bound by the treaties of the prede-
cessor sovereign by virtue of a principle of state succession’.137 The common
sense attraction of this proposition is irresistible: a new state that was not party
to a treaty cannot be bound by it, nor can other parties to a treaty be bound to
accept a new party in their midst.138 This proposition is also broadly consistent
with Article 16 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
respect of Treaties, according to which new states start with a ‘clean slate’,
even though they may expressly agree to be bound by treaties made on behalf
of their territory by the former sovereign. The ‘clean slate’ rule is borne out by
the example of the Baltic States, which, in regaining their independence in
1991, did not consider themselves as successor states to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), refusing to be bound by any of the treaties con-
cluded by the latter.139 Interestingly, a different solution applies in cases of
separation, where the presumption is one of continuity of treaties and member-
ship of international organizations with regard to each constituent part of the
defunct union.140 This proposition is borne out by the example of the demise of
Czechoslovakia, where the Czech Republic and Slovakia declared themselves
as successor states, stating their willingness to take over the international obli-
gations of former Czechoslovakia.141
The third and final proposition is that, in cases of mutations affecting the
territory, population and, possibly, also the system of government of a state, the
success of claims to continuity of treaties and membership of international
organizations crucially depends on the reactions of third parties and, in particu-
lar, on the support of the international community or, inversely, its opposition
to such claims.142 In the words of a commentator, ‘the law of state succession is
ultimately self-regarding—the question whether a new state is bound by par-
ticular conventional norms of succession is contingent upon a recognition that it
has, indeed, succeeded to those norms’.143 This proposition is readily borne out
international identity, whereas Singapore and Bangladesh were eventually admitted by the United
Nations (UN) as new states).
136 Shaw (n 17) 974 and fn 106.
137 Brownlie (n 20), 661.
138 Ibid 661.
139 Whether or not the example of the Baltic States is one of secession or, instead, of dissolution
(precluding any claim to succession) is not entirely clear (in this regard see Shaw (n 17) 961–2;
Brichambaut et al (n 129) 71; and Malanczuk (n 20) 165–6).
140 The above propositions are broadly consistent with the provisions of the 1978 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties (see, in particular, Arts 34 and 35).
141 On the Czechoslovak example see, generally, Schweisfurth (n 17) 339; and Malanczuk
(n 20) 167.
142 This point is made, amongst others, in Dupuy and Kerbrat (n 131) 74; Shaw (n 17) 970–1; and
Brownlie (n 20) especially 661–5.
143 Craven (n 129), 151.
EU Accession from Within?—An Introduction 27
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2014
http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
by a comparison between the examples of the demise of the USSR and
Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and the SFRY on the other. In the case of
the USSR and Czechoslovakia, there was ample support by the international
community to back the pretentions of Russia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia
to being treated as successor states. The backing of the international community
to the pretentions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, consisting of
Serbia and Montenegro) to continuing the SFRY was manifestly lacking, hence
the UN Security Council’s rejection of the FRY’s claims to continuity,144 echoed
by that of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission (‘the
Badinter Commission’).145
(iii) State continuity and succession in the EU context: what lessons
from PIL?
As will have become apparent from the preceding account, in PIL the (difficult)
question of state succession—ie whether or not one state has replaced another in
the responsibility for the international relations of a territory—is preceded by
that of continuity.146 In other words, if a state is deemed to continue to exist,
despite changes to its territory and population (and, possibly, also to its system
of government) the question of its succession by any newly created state entity to
particular rights and obligations (including those resulting from its participation
in international organizations) does not arise in the first place. In a (genuine)
secession scenario, the departure of one (or more) of the territorial components
of a state will not bring about the predecessor state’s dissolution: this will con-
tinue to exist as a rump state, carrying forward its legal personality, remaining
bound by any international treaties to which it had acceded prior to secession,
and retaining its place in any international organizations of which it had been a
member at the time of secession. For its part, the newly created state entity will
be a new subject of PIL. As a result, the newly created state entity will not
automatically step into the rights and obligations of the rump state (without
prejudice to its right to adopt freely an existing treaty, as per Article 16 of the
1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties).147
144 UN Doc. S/Res 757, 30 May 1992; UN Doc. S/Res 777 (1992).
145 In its Opinion No. 10, dated July 1992, the Badinter Commission found that, ‘the FRY (Serbia
and Montenegro) is a new state which cannot be considered the sole successor to the SFRY’ (para. 5).
146 See Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 72; Weller (n 12) 2–3; and Brownlie (n 20) 661.
147 Cases of consensual secession would, admittedly, represent something of a ‘grey area’ between
secession and dissolution, since, in practical terms, they would be indistinguishable from cases of
negotiated dissolution (exemplified by the demise of Czechoslovakia), where questions of state
continuity and succession do arise. Such cases would, nevertheless, represent something of a logical
aberration: secession is, by definition, non-consensual (even if it does not entail the use of armed
force), and it is readily distinguishable from dissolution, at least in terms of its concrete effects:
political events giving rise to a mere change in a state’s territorial status are, normally, consistent with
a secession scenario, while events leading to the disappearance of a state and its replacement by two or
more new states are, normally, consistent with a dissolution or a separation scenario (depending on
how consensual the underlying divorce was).
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It follows from the above that, in a genuine secession scenario, the question of
the automatic accession of a newly created state entity to the EU, as an incident
of ‘state succession’, does not arise as a matter of PIL. That question would only
arise where an existing EU Member State would cease to exist, with its territory
and population divided up (even if unequally) between two or more new state
entities, recognized as such by other states, with all the attendant implications in
terms of their membership of international organizations and their obligations
under existing treaties.148 It would also follow from the PIL propositions set out
above that, in a secession scenario, accession would, a priori, not be automatic,
with pre-accession negotiations being necessary, in line with Article 49 TEU.149
(iv) Concluding remarks: the relevance of PIL to State continuity and
secession in the EU context
Without prejudice to the preceding observations, it is conceded that there are
limits to the utility of the analogies drawn, in this context, from PIL and to the
latter’s suitability as a framework of reference for the assessment of the EU-
specific treatment of secession. Whilst it is not the aim of this paper to address,
in any detail, the controversial question of the legal nature of the EU and its
relationship to PIL,150 suffice it to make the following general observations on
the relevance of PIL to state continuity, specifically in the context of the EU.
In their original conception, the EC were akin to a regular international
organization, premised on Treaties that were negotiated in accordance with,
and legally binding under, PIL.151 However, the sui generis nature of the EC
148 Political circles favourable to Scotland’s potential secession have advanced the argument that
Scotland would not be a new state, but would instead carry forward the legal personality it presently
shares with the rest of the UK. Alternatively, both Scotland and the rump UK would be ‘new states’,
and would both need to apply for EU membership should they wish to, similar to the case of
Czechoslovakia (in this regard see Weller (n 12) 1–2; and Crawford and Boyle (n 15) 83–7).
Similar arguments have been advanced with regard to a potential secession of Catalonia from
Spain (in this regard see Happold (n 12) 1–2).
149 Taking into account the specificities of the dissolution scenario, an ‘accelerated EU accession’
procedure might be conceivable, subject to the consent of all existing EU Member States and to their
willingness to amend the Treaties, in line with Article 48 TEU, to render legally possible an
accelerated EU accession procedure specifically applicable to cases of dissolution.
150 This issue is discussed in more detail inter alia in Athanassiou (n 2) 15–18; M Lickova,
‘European Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International
Law 463; and De Witte, ‘Retour a` Costa—La primaute´ du droit communautaire a` la lumie`re du
droit international’ (1984) 20 Revue trimestrielle de droit europe´en 425.
151 See, for instance, J F McMahon, ‘The Court of the European Communities: Judicial
Interpretation and International Organisation’ (1961) 37 British Yearbook of International Law
320, 329 (‘[t]he origins, powers and objectives of the three Communities are all to be found in
international treaties’); and JHH Weiler and UR Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal
Order—Through the Looking Glass’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 411, 419
(‘[t]here is no doubt that the European legal order started its life as an international organisation
in the traditional sense, even if it had some unique features from its inception’). Another commen-
tator has treated Community law as a successful emanation of PIL (C Leben, ‘Hans Kelsen and the
Advancement of International Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 287, 298).
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was to be recognized early on, in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, first in Van
Gend en Loos (where the Court inter alia stated that EC law was capable of
having direct effect, ie of creating legal rights enforceable by both natural and
legal persons before domestic courts, independently of national law)152 and,
soon thereafter, in Costa v ENEL (where the Court introduced the doctrine of
the supremacy of EC over national law).153 In both cases, the main rationale for
the Court’s rulings was that the EC were conceived as a ‘new’ legal order,
creating not just rights and obligations between Member States but, also, for
those within their jurisdiction, including natural and legal persons or adminis-
trative agencies. The differences between the EC and a traditional international
organization were reflected in the existence of an assembly and other institu-
tional organs, whose presence entailed a certain role for social actors, in the
existence of a nexus between Member State and EC law, expressed most visibly
in the preliminary rulings procedure, and in the reference, in the preambles of
the Treaties, to the ‘peoples of Europe’.154
These two seminal rulings of the Court were sufficient to elevate the EC from
a regular intergovernmental organization to a more sui generis legal status, with
certain attributes similar to those encountered in federal states. The EU is,
perhaps, unique amongst international organizations in sharing a number of
traits typical both of classical inter-state cooperation organizations and federal or
confederate-type structures. The distribution of competences between the EU
and the Member States (Article 2 TFEU), underscored by the principle of
sincere cooperation (Article 4 TFEU), the judicially declared irrevocability of
the transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to the EU, the EU’s system
of autonomous regulatory production, the institutional structure of the EU, as
well as the EU’s legal capacity and international representation powers are,
152 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie des Belastingen [1963] ECR 3,
where the Court stated that, ‘[I]ndependently of the legislation of Member States, Community
law . . . not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them
rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly
granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined
way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the Institutions of the
Community.’
153 See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, where the Court stated that, ‘[B]y contrast with
ordinary international treaties the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry
into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which
their courts are bound to apply. . . . By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the inter-
national plain and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a
transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign
rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. . . . The
transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights
and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign
rights’.
154 See, generally, J Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’,
in Martti Koskenniemi (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, The
Netherlands 1998) 231–53.
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arguably, more reminiscent of a federal (or ‘parafederal’) structure, than they are
of a regular international organization.155 The ‘robustly dualist’156 reasoning of
the Court in Kadi157 (where the Court refused to allow a UN Security Council
resolution to enjoy primacy over EU law) has strongly emphasized the separ-
ateness and autonomy of the EU from other legal systems and from the inter-
national legal order, in particular.
If the EU has, gradually, lost its moorings in PIL, and if it can no longer
meaningfully be regarded as a regular international organization (despite having
originally been a creature of international law)158 there is, decidedly, a limit to
the utility of the lessons drawn from PIL with regard to the treatment and
consequences of secession in the context of the EU.
II. ‘Internal EU enlargement?’: The EMU perspective
It has been argued in Part I of this paper that there is no automatic right of
accession to the EU upon secession from an EU Member State. Given that
EMU is a ‘subset of the EU’, it would logically follow that there can also be no
automatic right of accession to the single currency upon secession from an EMU
Member State.159 Part II explores the issue of the existence, or otherwise, of an
automatic right of accession to EMU for seceding State entities that were for-
merly part of an existing euro area Member State (Section A); it then inquires
into the relevance, for cases of secession, of precedents involving territorial
entities, which, while having undergone changes in their status as part of an
internal territorial modification process, and ‘withdrawn’ from the EU, have
nevertheless retained the euro as their (sole) legal tender (Section B); finally, it
outlines the legal implications of EMU accession, as well as the EMU accession
155 Arguments to this effect have been advanced, inter alia, by Harhoff (n 5) 29–30; J Weiler,
‘Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization: The Case of the EEC’ (1985) 20
Israel Law Review 282, 285–6; Louis, The Community Legal Order (European Commission, Brussels,
1993) 11–18 and 75–77; Friel (n 2) 412; Athanassiou (n 2) 9–18; and Matas et al (n 33) 17–27.
156 G De Bu´rca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’
(2010) 51(1) Harvard International Law Journal 1, 23.
157 See n 108. For an assessment of the Court’s ruling in Kadi see C Tomuschat, ‘The Kadi Case:
What Relationship is there between the Universal Legal Order under the Auspices of the United
Nations and the EU Legal Order?’ [2009] Yearbook of European Law 654; De Bu´rca (n 156); and
J Kokott and C Sobotta, ‘The Kadi Case—Constitutional Core Values and International Law—
Finding the Balance?’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 1015.
158 The point is not entirely uncontroversial: see, for instance, Moorhead, who has cogently argued
that the EU legal order is, essentially, one of international law, and that the supremacy of EU law
obligations over domestic law ones is merely based on the principle of the supremacy of international
over national law (T Moorhead ‘European Union Law as International Law’ (2012) 5 European
Journal of Legal Studies 126).
159 Athanassiou (n 2) 29. For an earlier, pre-Lisbon Treaty assessment of the possible withdrawal of
Member States from the EU, see H de Waele, ‘The European Union on the Road to a new Legal
Order—The Changing Legality of Member State Withdrawal’ (2004–2005) Tilburg Foreign Law
Review 12, 169.
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criteria and procedure (Section C). The main conclusions drawn from our
analysis are summarized at the end of this Part (Section D).
A few points of terminology are apposite, before turning to the substance of
our analysis. As used in this Part, the term ‘euro area’ denotes those EU Member
States where the euro has been formally adopted, following the procedure pre-
scribed in the Treaty, and where monetary policy is conducted under the re-
sponsibility of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB).
The term ‘ESCB’ denotes the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of all
EU Member States (including those where the single currency has yet to be
formally adopted), while the term ‘Eurosystem’ refers to the monetary authority
of the euro area comprising the ECB, the NCBs of the EMU-participating
Member States, and the collective decision-making bodies through which the
single monetary policy is defined and implemented. The terms ‘euro area
Member State’ and ‘EMU-participating Member State’ are used interchange-
ably. The terms ‘euro’ and ‘single currency’ are used as synonyms, and the same
is true of the terms ‘accession to the euro area’ and ‘adoption of the single
currency’.
A. Separation from an EMU-participating Member State—what rights
of accession to EMU?
The Treaties are silent on the possibility of an internal enlargement of
EMU. Moreover, there is, to date, no precedent of secession from an EMU-
participating Member State, nor is there any precedent of part of an EMU
Member State having attained its full independence and, yet, retained the
single currency as its legal tender. Absent any precedent, some might be tempted
to argue that it would be artificial for a state entity resulting from secession from
an EMU Member State to have to ‘re-apply’ for admission to EMU, when the
euro was already in circulation in its territory, as sole legal tender. Despite its
common-sense attraction, the above proposition conflates a de facto situation
with the Treaties’ very specific understanding of the concept of the (regulated)
adoption of the single currency. It is for that reason, legally objectionable. The
remainder of this section will examine the reasons why.
As explained later in this Part (Section C), the first stage towards EMU
accession is EU accession. It follows that the prior use of the single currency
in the territory of a state entity resulting from secession from a euro area
Member State does not, ipso facto, provide any legal basis for a Member
State’s automatic accession to EMU, nor does it afford any legitimate expect-
ation of the continued use of the single currency, based on past practice or
historical considerations: a new state entity would first need to accede to the
EU before introducing the single currency. Leaving the above considerations
aside, the EMU accession procedure prescribed in the Treaty is silent on the
possibility of deviations for the benefit of States resulting from secession from
Athanassiou and Shaelou32
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2014
http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EMU-participating Member States. One way to interpret the silence of the
Treaties is that the possibility of secession was never envisaged by the fathers
of the Treaties, who have not specifically catered for it for that reason, rather
than on account of any principled objection to a ‘customized’ (whether ‘sim-
plified’ or ‘accelerated’) EMU accession procedure, reserved for deserving cases.
Another way to interpret the silence of the Treaties on the possibility of an
internal EMU enlargement is as an expression of a clear institutional opposition
to any deviation from the prescribed EMU accession route: any such deviation,
the argument runs, would contradict the letter of the Treaties and negate the
fundamental economic rationale underlying EMU.
The second of the above two interpretations is clearly supported by the letter
of the Treaties. De lege lata there is no legal basis for a differentiated EMU
accession procedure. EMU, one should not forget, is a rules-based system: it is
of the essence to its continuing existence (and to its economic rationale) that the
same objective accession criteria apply to all candidates alike. As explained later
in this Part (Section C), whether or not these criteria are fulfilled in an indi-
vidual case is a function of a detailed assessment by the Commission and the
ECB. This assessment cannot meaningfully be substituted with a mere declar-
ation of compliance, motivated by reference to factual considerations. The
requirement for an assessment applies equally to all candidates, however an
aspirant Member State may have come into being. Besides, from a purely prac-
tical perspective, it is difficult to see how any of the EMU accession criteria can
be relaxed.160 Leaving aside obvious equal treatment considerations (to which
there is also a substantive angle, as the on-going European sovereign debt crisis
has shown)161 neither the economic nor the legal convergence criteria are amen-
able to automatic fulfilment: positive action needs to be taken by the candidate
country (in terms of fiscal and budgetary efforts, complemented by extensive
legislative amendments), followed by an assessment of the adequacy of such
action by the Commission and the ECB, and by a decision of the European
Council to lift the candidate’s derogation. No circumvention of the existing
EMU accession procedures would be legally permissible without a prior amend-
ment to the Treaties, following the simplified revision procedure of Article 48
TEU (which, as the reader will recall, calls for a unanimous decision of the
European Council to adopt the proposed Treaty amendment).
Would the above necessarily lead to the conclusion that the single currency
would unavoidably have to be withdrawn as legal tender from the territory of a
state entity resulting from secession from an EMU-participating Member State,
and replaced by a new (and possibly temporary) national currency? The regu-
lated adoption of the single currency, understood as a Member State’s formal
160 The one possible exception is that of the two-year ERM-II waiting period, which could be
shortened, but only subject to a prior amendment to the Treaties, to that effect.
161 The sovereign debt crisis has confirmed the importance of the institutional accession procedure,
prescribed in the Treaties, to ensure that only deserving candidates accede to EMU.
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participation in EMU, within the meaning of the Treaties162 is to be distin-
guished from its (full) ‘euroization’, defined as the sole use of the euro as legal
tender, in conjunction with the parallel abolition of its domestic currency but
without fixing, consensually, the irrevocable conversion rate of the (former)
domestic currency vis-a`-vis the euro.163 There are two distinct ‘euroization’
possibilities, the unilateral and the consensual. The EU’s negative views on uni-
lateral euroization by candidates for EU accession and Member States with a
derogation are well established.164 On the unilateral use of the euro by third
countries (including, by implication, state entities resulting from secession) there
is no clearly formulated EU position, despite the fact that there are examples of
third countries or entities where the euro is used as (the sole and official) legal
tender (eg Montenegro and Kosovo and, previously, also Andorra). What is, in
any event, clear is that third countries cannot unilaterally adopt the euro for-
mally, since there is no procedure in the Treaties for the Council’s approval of
the adoption of the single currency by third countries. While State entities
resulting from secession from an EMU-participating Member State would not
have a domestic currency that they could, strictly speaking, ‘euroize’ unilaterally,
the Commission’s and the ECB’s165 position on unilateral euroization by
162 The formal participation of a Member State in EMU is inter alia reflected in the contribution of
the Governor of its NCB, as a fully-fledged Member of the ECB Governing Council, in the defin-
ition of the single monetary policy, in the issuance of euro banknotes and coins by its NCB, or in its
sharing of the resulting seignorage income.
163 S Levasseur, ‘Why not Euroisation?’ (2004) 91(5) Revue de l’OFCE 121–155, 123.
164 ‘Any unilateral adoption of the single currency by means of “euroisation” would run counter to
the underlying economic reasoning of EMU in the Treaty, which foresees the eventual adoption of
the euro as the endpoint of a structured convergence process within a multilateral framework.
Therefore, unilateral ‘euroisation’ would not be a way to circumvent the stages foreseen by the
Treaty for the adoption of the euro’ (EC DGII, ‘Enlargement Argumentaire’, Enlargement Papers
No 5, 2001, 21). For additional references, see Council Reply to Written Question E-3950/00 by
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (GUE/NGL) to the Council, 2001/C 235 E/041, available at:
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:235E:0037:0038:EN:PDF>
last accessed on 31 August 2013; Policy Position of the Governing Council of the European Central
Bank on Exchange Rate Issues Relating to the Acceding Countries, available at: <http://www.ecb.
int/pub/pdf/other/policyaccexchangerateen.pdf> last accessed on 31 August 2013; and Commission
Staff Working Document Analytical Report accompanying the Communication from The
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Commission Opinion on
Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union, Brussels, 9 November 2010
SEC(2010) 1334 available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/pack
age/mn_rapport_2010_en.pdf> last accessed on 31 August 2013.
165 The ECB’s position on unilateral euroisation is summarised in the following statement: ‘the
ECB . . . would neither encourage nor facilitate such a move. Countries which unilaterally introduce
the euro would do so in their responsibility and at their own risk, without committing the EU or the
ECB. The ECB would thus pursue a policy of non-engagement and non-support towards these
countries’ (J Stark, ‘The adoption of the euro: principles, procedures and criteria’, Speech delivered
to the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce, Reykjavik, 13 February 2008, available at: <http://www.
ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/sp080213.en.html> last accessed on 31 August 2013). In the case
of non-EU EEA Member States, the EEA Treaty provides for mandatory ‘monetary cooperation’,
which is understood as prohibiting unilateral euroisation by non-EU EEA Member States. Prior
agreement with the EU would be required.
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acceding countries (and Member States with a derogation) suggests that the
policy stance of both EU institutions would almost certainly be negative also
in their case.166 The economic and political costs of unilateral euroization would
need to be weighed against its perceived benefits before a state entity resulting
from secession from an EMU-participating Member State embarks on it in the
aftermath of secession, faced with the practical difficulties of ‘de-euroizing’ its
economy and introducing a new currency.167
While euroization would be highly controversial if carried out unilaterally
by a state entity resulting from secession from an EMU-participating
Member State, the same need not be true in a case of consensual euroization.
Article 219(3) TFEU already provides for the possibility of concluding
Monetary Agreements with third States or international organizations,168 and
there are several examples of such agreements to date.169 Interestingly for the
purposes of this paper, the rationale for the conclusion of the hitherto monetary
agreements with the EU has been that all of the third States concerned had been
using a legacy currency of the euro prior to the physical introduction of the
single currency.170 Drawing on the extant examples, a Monetary Agreement
with a newly created state entity would need to regulate, apart from the use
of the euro as legal tender, (a) the obligation to protect the single currency
against counterfeiting; (b) the conditions subject to which financial institutions
operating in the territory of the seceding state entity could accede to interbank
settlement and payments and securities settlement systems; (c) the obligation to
adopt all appropriate measures with a view to implementing selected EU legal
acts in the areas of banking and financial law; and (d) the option for the parties
to terminate the agreement, upon notice. One key issue that such an agreement
could not address in the case of a seceding state entity, absent a national currency
amenable to a stricto sensu euroization, is that of the consensual fixing of the
irrevocable conversion rate of the (former) domestic currency vis-a`-vis
166 ‘From the point of view of equal treatment, it would be difficult to conceive that the EU would
be more open towards euroisation by non-candidate countries than by candidate countries or
Member States with a derogation’ (ibid).
167 In this regard see, for instance, A. Winkler et al., ‘Official Dollarisation/Euroisation: Motives,
Features and Policy Implications of Current Cases’, ECB Occasional Paper Series No.11, February
2004, available at:<http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp11.pdf> last accessed on 31 August
2013; and Levasseur (n 163).
168 Monetary agreements are to be entered into by the EU Council (representing the EU) and the
relevant third State or international organisation. There is, however, a precedent of such an agree-
ment having been entered into with an EU Member State, acting for the benefit of one of its overseas
collectivities (see Part II, section B of this paper).
169 The reference is to the monetary agreements entered into with the Principalities of Andorra and
Monaco, the Republic of San Marino, and the Vatican City State, and published in the Official
Journal of the European Union.
170 For an overview of the extant Monetary Agreements, see ‘Monetary and Exchange Rate
Arrangements of the Euro Area with Selected Third Countries and Territories’, ECB Monthly
Bulletin, April 2006, 87.
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the euro.171 Moreover, unlike in the case of the Monetary Agreements with the
Principalities of Andorra and Monaco, the Republic of San Marino and the
Vatican City State, an agreement entered into with a seceding state entity could
obviously not authorize that entity to issue its own euro coins.172 Whilst uni-
lateral euroization is not compatible with qualifying for EMU membership, the
possibility of consensual euroization is one that newly created state entities may
be tempted to explore.173 As in the case of unilateral euroization, the costs of
consensual euroization would need to be assessed by the political establishment
in a newly created state entity and explained to its public opinion.
B. The relevance to the debate of cases of internal territorial
modification processes: the example of Saint Barthe´lemy
While there is no precedent of secession from an EMU-participating Member
State, there is at least one recent example of an internal territorial modification
process affecting an existing EMU Member State, which was not accompanied
by withdrawal from circulation of the single currency from the part of its ter-
ritory concerned by the modification process in question, despite the fact
that the said territory ceased to fall within the territorial scope of application
of the Treaties (and, by extension, also EMU).174 This section briefly examines
the relevance of cases such as this to the secession debate and, in particular, the
insights that these cases can provide on whether or not there is, in the event of
secession, an automatic right of accession to (or, more properly, retention of) the
single currency. What is worth noting from the outset is that there are limits to
the analogies that can be drawn from the situation of territories/dependencies of
171 The practical reason accounting for the EU’s opposition to euroisation outside the framework of
the Treaties is that, in such a constellation, the entry exchange rate into EMU cannot be fixed in
negotiation between the candidate and existing member countries (see W Buiter and C Grafe,
‘Anchor, Float or Abandon Ship: Exchange Rate Regimes for the Accession Countries’ (2002)
Banca nazionale del lavoro quarterly review 55, 112–42). It has been argued that the ‘agreed conver-
sion rate requirement’ could be met if euroisation were to occur ‘as an agreed alternative to joining
ERM II’, with the EU authorities asked to approve the equivalent of the ERM II central rate (Kenen
and Meade, ‘Substance and Semantics in ERM II’, Central Banking Journal, 25 May 2004, available
at: <http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/feature/2074664/substance-seman
tics-erm-ii)> last accessed on 31 August 2013.
172 In this regard, see ECB Opinion CON/2011/22 on a recommendation for a Council decision on
the arrangements for the negotiation of a Monetary Agreement with the French Republic, acting for
the benefit of the French overseas collectivity of Saint-Barthe´lemy, para. 2.
173 It has aptly been observed that, once Montenegro has joined the EU and become a euro area
candidate, the EU institutions will, in any event, face the problem of what to do with a non-euro area
country that has informally ‘adopted’ the euro as its national currency (see W Buiter, ‘A wave of
unilateral “euro-isations” would confound the EU’s mean-spirited legal nitpickers’, available at:
<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/article-
view/ArticleID/20412/language/en-US/Default.aspx> last accessed on 31 August 2013).
174 For a general and comprehensive appraisal of the EMU participation of the Member States’
various overseas territories, see F Amtenbrink, ‘EMU and the Overseas’ in D Kochenov (ed.) EU Law
of the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2011).
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Member States, since these territories are, by definition overseas, and not a
metropolitan part of the EU Member State to which they are attached.175
The island of Saint Barthe´lemy was, for several years, a French municipality
(commune), falling under the jurisdiction of Guadeloupe, a French De´partement
d’Outre Mer (hence, an integral part of French and EU territory).176 In a ref-
erendum held on 7 December 2003, the inhabitants of Saint Barthe´lemy sought
their separation from the jurisdiction of Guadeloupe, and their transformation
into a Communaute´ d’Outre Mer (an ‘overseas collectivity’), in accordance with
Article 74 of the French Constitution. This separation was accomplished in
2007. Under the terms of EU Council Decision 2010/718/EU of 29 October
2010 amending the status with regard to the European Union of the island of
Saint Barthe´lemy,177 the island was to cease to be part of the EU as of 1 January
2012. Since that date, the island of Saint Barthe´lemy has ceased to be an
outermost region (OR) of the EU, within the meaning of Article 349 TFEU,
and has instead enjoyed, as of the same date, the status of an Overseas Country
or Territory (OCT), within the meaning of Article 355(2) TFEU. According to
the CJEU, ‘in so far as they remain outside the ambit of the EEC Treaty,
[OCTs] are, as regards the Community, in the same situation as non-member
countries’.178 Interestingly, Saint Barthe´lemy is only the second Member State
territory to have ever become separated from the EU (or the EC) after
Greenland.179
Despite having, for all intents and purposes, ‘withdrawn’ from the EU,180
Saint Barthe´lemy has retained the euro as its sole currency. This has been ac-
complished by virtue of a Monetary Agreement on the basis of Article 219(3)
TFEU, concluded between the French Republic (representing the island of Saint
Barthe´lemy) and the EU Council (representing the EU).181 The Monetary
Agreement in question is the first one to have been entered into not with a
175 Although the degree of autonomy of the overseas territories of Member States may greatly vary,
the main difference with the scenario of state secession presented in this paper is that the former
territories remain associated to a given EU Member State. The Treaties are applicable in theory to the
entire territory of the Member States, including overseas or dependent territories and to any terri-
tories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible (Art. 355(3) TFEU), unless other-
wise expressly provided in the Treaties. For an up-to-date and in-depth legal analysis of the status of
territories associated to EU Member States, see Kochenov (ed.), EU law of the Overseas: Outermost
Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Kluwer Law
International, The Netherlands, 2011).
176 On the status of overseas departments see Case 148/77, Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978]
ECR 1787, para 10 and n 26.
177 OJ L 325, 9 December 2010, 4.
178 Opinion 1/94 of the Court of 15 November 1994, on the Competence of the Community to
conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property—
Art. 228 (6) of the EC Treaty, [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 17.
179 On Greenland’s separation from Denmark and ‘withdrawal’ from the EC see nns 5 and 22.
180 The one exception is to do with the provisions of part IV of the TFEU, on the association of the
OCTs with the EU.
181 OJ L 189, 20 July 2011, 3.
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third country (as in the case of the agreements with the Principalities of Andorra
and Monaco, the Republic of San Marino, and the Vatican City State) but with
an EU Member State (France), acting for the benefit of one of its OCTs.
Moreover, unlike previous agreements, the Monetary Agreement in question
does not provide for the possibility of issuing, locally, euro coins. Its main
purpose is to ensure that directly applicable EU law (including ECB regulations
and decisions) in the areas of monetary, banking, and financial legislation, as
well as statistics, anti-money laundering, and euro counterfeiting apply to Saint-
Barthe´lemy.
While no doubt instructive, the example of Saint Barthe´lemy does not set a
direct precedent for cases of secession, which one could draw on for guidance
relevant to the situation of newly created state entities to assess the nature of
their rights, if any, to continue using the single currency even after they have
become separated from an EMU Member State. This is because OCTs are
distinguishable from independent states in the following material respects:182
(i) whilst autonomous (or semi-autonomous), OCTs remain constitutionally
linked to their home EU Member State; OCTs are, therefore, not independent
countries, stricto sensu, despite being assimilable thereto, in some respects;183
(ii) as a result, OCTs lack the legal capacity to enter into international relations
with States or organizations (their interests are, instead, represented by their
respective home Member State); and (iii) the inhabitants of OCTs retain the
nationality of their home Member State, although an OCT’s territory does not
qualify as part of the EU.184 Specifically as regards the EMU status of OCTs, the
following considerations apply, which clearly distinguish their situation from
that of independent countries (whether resulting from secession or not): (i) it is
the NCB of an OCT’s home euro area Member State (or another institution
under the control of their home Member State) that is responsible for carrying
out, in their territory, all tasks falling within the scope of competences of the
Eurosystem; (ii) it is an OCT’s home euro area Member State that is responsible
for extending the application of all EMU-specific EU financial regulation to the
OCT’s territory, and for monitoring compliance therewith; and, last but not
least, (iii) capital support for banks or other financial institutions operating
within an OCT’s territory, as well as emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) ex-
tended to such banks or other institutions are to be provided by the Treasury of
the relevant OCT’s home euro area Member State or by that Member State’s
NCB, respectively. In contrast to an independent country, OCTs lack decisive
powers in any of the aforementioned respects.
182 For an account of the specificities of OCTs and an overview of the OCT Treaty Framework see
F. Murray, The European Union and Member State Territories: A New Legal Framework Under the
Treaties (Asser Press, The Hague 2012), especially Chapters 10 and 17.
183 See Opinion 1/94 of the Court (n 178).
184 Murray (n 182), 93.
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The case of Saint Barthe´lemy is not an example of secession but, merely, one
of internal territorial modification, which is to be distinguished from that of the
creation, through secession from an EMU-participating Member State, of a new
State. The specificities of OCTs, and their continuing attachment to an EMU-
participating Member State, despite their withdrawal from the EU, explain the
involvement of the competent authorities of the French Republic in negotiating,
with the EU, a Monetary Agreement for Saint Barthe´lemy, and their continuing
role, subsequent to that agreement’s entry into force, in monitoring compliance
with its terms and provisions. The continuing use of the single currency in the
island of Saint Barthe´lemy was, therefore, the result of a mutual agreement,
rather than the automatic consequence of its transformation into an OCT,
despite the uninterrupted use in its territory, since 1 January 2002, of the
single currency.
C. Euro adoption procedure and implications
(i) Introductory remarks
One of the recurring questions in the public debate surrounding the issue of
secession is whether a newly created state entity would be under a legal obliga-
tion to formally adopt the single currency after joining the EU. For the reasons
set out in this subsection, it is submitted that this question is to be answered in
the affirmative.
With the exception of a handful of EU Member States that enjoy the benefit
of a specific, Treaty-based derogation (popularly referred to as an ‘opt-out’),185
all remaining EU Member States are under an implicit, non-time-bound legal
obligation186 to accede to the third stage of EMU (i.e. adopt the single currency)
upon fulfilment of the applicable criteria (see below). Until such time as they
have fulfilled those criteria and been admitted to the euro area, EU Member
States are to be treated as ‘Member States with a (temporary) derogation’, within
the meaning of Article 139 TFEU. The temporary (and transitional) nature of
derogations from the third stage of EMU and, indirectly, the mandatory char-
acter of EMU accession are abundantly clear in the text of Article 141 TFEU.187
185 The only EU Member States benefiting from a Treaty-based opt-out from EMU are Denmark
and the UK. Both Member States secured derogations at the time of the negotiation of the Maastricht
Treaty (see Protocol 15, for the UK, and Protocols 16–17, for Denmark, annexed to the TFEU).
186 This obligation is derived from Articles 140(1) and 140(2) TFEU, which point to the commit-
ment of non EMU-participating Member States to maintain momentum towards the abrogation of
their derogations and their eventual transition to the single currency.
187 This inter alia provides that ‘If and as long as there are Member States with a derogation [emphasis
added] . . . the General Council of the European Central Bank referred to in Art. 44 of the Statute of
the ESCB and of the ECB shall be constituted as a third decision-making body of the European
Central Bank’ and that, ‘If and as long as there are Member States with a derogation [emphasis added],
the European Central Bank shall, as regards those Member States’ assume a number of coordination
and cooperation tasks.
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They are also reflected in the EU Commission’s consistent practice of discoura-
ging the holding of national referenda for the adoption of the single currency.188
Although euro membership is obligatory, it is not automatic for those Member
States that do not fulfil the accession criteria. Moreover, despite positing acces-
sion to the euro area as the ‘final destination’ for all EU Member States (except
for those with a Treaty-based opt-out) the Treaties do not specify an exact
timeframe for the adoption, by an EU Member State, of the single currency.
Besides, one of the mandatory requirements for joining the euro area and, at the
same time, one of the key elements for setting the target date for euro adoption
namely, a two year membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM-II) is voluntary, even if only in terms of the choice of the moment for a
Member State to apply for such membership. The above observations do not
detract from the legally obligatory character of EMU accession for all EU
Member States, save for those with a Treaty-based opt-out: they merely point
to the leeway that Member States have in terms of their choice of the target date
for euro adoption.189 It is telling of the EU Member States’ perception of EMU
accession as a legal obligation deriving from their EU membership that of the 10
countries that joined the EU in 2004, six had already acceded, at the time of
writing, to the euro area, with another two planning to join in the foreseeable
future.190 The remainder were at least reflecting on the issue of euro adoption,
however much espousing a ‘wait and see’ approach. In the same vein, both of the
2007 EU Enlargement Member States had plans to adopt the single currency by
2017, despite delays and postponements, attributable, in part, to the on-set of
the European sovereign debt crisis.191
While it is, in theory, conceivable that acceding Member States could nego-
tiate permanent opt-outs with their EU partners, recorded in the relevant
Accession Treaties, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that they will achieve
what only few others before them have achieved: their negotiated exemption
from the Monetary Policy Chapter of the Treaty, with the seal of approval of the
188 The EU Commission has discouraged the holding of referenda for the adoption of the euro,
except in the case of Member States which have either secured opt-outs (Denmark) or where the
possibility of referenda has been explicitly recognized by all parties, even absent a formal opt-out
(Sweden). The rationale of the Commission’s stance is that, by deciding to join the EU, Member
States have assumed the obligation to also join (at a later stage) the euro area. Because the issue of euro
area membership has already been decided as part of the EU membership package, it cannot be
reopened.
189 The sui generis example of Sweden (which, while not having formally negotiated an opt-out, as it
only joined the EU in 1995, after the Maastricht Treaty was signed, has not joined ERM II and
wilfully avoids meeting the convergence criteria on technical issues, relative to the legislation gov-
erning its NCB) suggests that Member States, including those without an opt-out, have considerable
room for manoeuvre in terms of when they are to actually adopt the single currency.
190 Lithuania was expected to adopt the euro in 2015. At the time of publication, Latvia was the last
EU Member State to have adopted the euro (1 January 2014).
191 The reference is to Romania and Bulgaria, whose original tentative euro adoption target dates of
2015 and 2014 respectively have been postponed.
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European Council. Indeed, the prevailing view is that no new derogations from
EMU are conceivable going forward: the window of opportunity for any such
derogations closed at the time of the Maastricht Treaty-related negotiations,
with no fresh derogations from EMU being possible anymore. EMU accession
has, in other words, become part of the Union acquis for all new EU Member
States.192 Besides, it is unlikely, to say the least, whether state entities resulting
from secession from a Member State with an opt-out would ‘inherit’, as a matter
of PIL, the rump Member State’s opt-out: for the reasons explained in Part I,
state succession would only be possible in a case of dissolution of a Member
State, but not in a case of secession. The prospect of euro area membership,
however distant in time, is, therefore, in the authors’ view, inescapable, and it is
as such that it should be portrayed in the public debate surrounding secession.
With the above considerations in mind, the following paragraphs provide an
outline of the EMU accession procedure, followed by an account of some of the
principal institutional and financial implications of EMU participation for new
Member States (including those resulting from secession) and their NCBs.
(ii) EMU accession procedure: an outline
Except in the case of Member States with a Treaty-based opt-out, accession to
EMU is mandatory for all EU Member States, not only as an outcome (see Part I,
Section A(iii)) but, also, in terms of procedure: candidates need to fulfil certain
prescribed ‘convergence criteria’, including currency convergence as part of
ERM-II, and follow a pre-determined, ‘institutional’ path to accession before
adopting the single currency.
The EMU accession procedure involves three distinct (but inter-related) con-
secutive stages, of which the first is formal accession to the EU.193 The second
stage is a Member State’s participation, for a minimum of two years, in
ERM-II:194 this involves the setting of a central parity and the observance of
the currency fluctuation bands by the EMU candidate Member State, without
substantial fluctuations throughout the two-year reference period. The third and
final stage involves an assessment, by the Commission and the ECB, of the
EMU candidate Member State’s fulfilment of the economic and legal conver-
gence criteria (see the following paragraphs). The former are designed to ensure
that the economy of a new euro area Member State is sufficiently prepared for its
integration to the monetary regime backing the single currency, while the latter
192 Buiter and Grafe (n 171) 112–13.
193 As explained earlier, EU membership is, legally, a sine qua non condition for the adoption of the
single currency, in the genuine sense of the term (that of formal EMU membership).
194 ERM II was established by virtue of a Resolution of the European Council of 16 June 1997
(OJ C 236, 2 August 1997, 5–6) as a multilateral arrangement of fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates
with a central rate and a standard fluctuation band of 15%, the aim of which is to link the
currencies of non-euro area Member States to the euro. Within the framework of ERM II, exchange
rate stability is explicitly subordinated to the primary objective of price stability for all participating
currencies.
EU Accession from Within?—An Introduction 41
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2014
http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
are geared towards ensuring that national legislation is compatible with the
Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank (the Statute).195
Starting with the economic convergence criteria (popularly referred to as the
‘Maastricht criteria’, agreed by Member States in 1991, at the time of the
preparations for the creation of the single currency), these are formally defined
in Article 140(1) TFEU as a set of macroeconomic indicators measuring price
stability (to demonstrate that inflation is under control), the soundness and
sustainability of public finances (to avert excessive deficits), exchange-rate sta-
bility for a continued period of at least two years, without significant deviations
from the ERM-II central rate (to demonstrate that a Member State can manage
its economy without recourse to excessive currency fluctuations),196 and long-
term interest rate stability (to help assess the durability of the convergence
achieved by fulfilling the above criteria). To meet the economic convergence
criteria, Member States need to display sustained fiscal and budgetary discipline.
The proclaimed automaticity of EMU accession is apt to gloss over the degree of
collective effort, commitment, and perseverance required to meet the economic
convergence criteria, downplaying the cost of EMU accession and the future
risks for an acceding country if its EMU accession is achieved in a non-durable,
short-lived, or otherwise unsustainable manner.197
Apart from fulfilling the economic convergence criteria, candidates for acces-
sion to the euro area will also need to amend (in some cases more fundamentally
than in others) their national legal frameworks, in line with the Treaty and the
Statute, with an emphasis on the rules governing the organization and operation
of their NCBs. The necessary legal adjustments seek to guarantee, in particular,
their smooth integration in the Eurosystem as well as central bank independence
as a condition precedent to the design and implementation of a credible mon-
etary policy, free of the vagaries of national political processes and without
regard to electoral cycles.198 Significantly, compliance with the Treaty and the
Statute are on-going (rather than point-in-time) duties of acceding Member
States, which are not exhausted at the time of their accession to EMU.
Compliance with the Treaty and the Statute are inter alia monitored through
the ECB’s advisory role, touched on later in this section. The implications of the
195 The Statute is appended as Protocol No. 4 to the TFEU, and forms an integral part thereof.
196 The exchange rate criterion also provides an indication of the appropriate conversion rate that
should be applied when a Member State qualifies and its currency is irrevocably fixed.
197 The European sovereign financial crisis provides ample illustrations of the implications of
Member States achieving nominal economic convergence in an unsustainable manner.
198 There is a wealth of empirical research on the benefits of central bank independence. See, for
instance, A Alesina and LH Summers, ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic
Performance’ (1993) 25 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 151; O Issing, ‘Central Bank
Independence—Economic and Political Dimensions’ (2006) 1 National Institute Economic
Review 66; F Papadia and Ruggiero, ‘Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a
Stable Euro’ [1999] Open Economies Review 63; R Smits, The European Central Bank—Institutional
Aspects (Kluwer, The Netherlands 1997), 154ff.
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legal adjustments required for EMU accession (and the continuing duty to con-
sult the ECB on all draft legislative provisions within its fields of competence—
see the next paragraph) should not be underestimated, nor downplayed, in the
public debate surrounding secession if misconceptions are to be avoided, and if
false expectations of a one-off accession effort, terminating on the day of the
adoption of the single currency, are not to be aroused.
Turning briefly to the assessment of compliance with the convergence criteria,
it follows from Article 140(1)–(3) TFEU that at least once every two years, or at
the request of a Member State with a (temporary) derogation, the Commission
and the ECB are to assess the progress made by the euro-area candidate coun-
tries and publish their conclusions in their respective Convergence Reports.
After consulting the European Parliament and after discussion in the
European Council, the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission,
decide which Member States with a derogation fulfil the necessary EMU acces-
sion conditions, and abrogate their derogations. The Council shall act having
received a recommendation of a qualified majority199 of those among its mem-
bers representing Member States whose currency is the euro. These members
shall act within six months of the Council receiving the Commission’s proposal.
If it is decided to abrogate a derogation, the Council shall, acting with the
unanimity of the Member States whose currency is the euro and the Member
State concerned, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
ECB, irrevocably fix the rate at which the euro shall be substituted for the
currency of the Member State concerned, and take all other measures necessary
for the introduction of the euro in the Member State concerned. At the time of
writing, Latvia was the EU Member State to have most recently joined the euro
(January 2014), following the institutional path prescribed in the Treaty, with its
neighbouring Lithuania preparing to adopt the single currency on 1 January
2015. Others are expected to follow in their steps in the next five years.
(iii) Implications of EMU participation
Accession to the euro area entails a permanent limitation of a Member State’s
sovereignty in the field of monetary and exchange rate policy, which, for partici-
pating Member States (defined as those whose currency is the euro), are exclusive
EU competences,200 exercised, in full independence,201 and for the benefit of the
entire euro area, by the decision-making bodies of the ECB, the euro area’s single
monetary authority. Whilst the Governor of the NCB of an acceding euro area
Member State will sit, ex officio, at the Governing Council (the ECB’s supreme
199 The qualified majority of the said members, as referred to in the second subparagraph, shall be
defined in accordance with Art. 238(3)(a)TFEU.
200 See Art. 3(1) (c) TFEU.
201 Central bank independence, enshrined in Art. 130 TFEU and Art. 7 of the Statute, is central to
the philosophy and modus operandi of the ESCB, and to its pursuit of price stability as its primary
objective, in line with Art. 127 TFEU.
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decision-making body), contributing to the design of the single monetary policy
on an equal footing with all other Governing Council Members,202 the task of her
home NCB will be to implement the monetary policy decisions of the Governing
Council (as opposed to independently deciding on matters of monetary policy),
in line with the Statute, its national implementation of the General
Documentation,203 and the principle of ‘decentralization of operations’.204 It is
worth recalling here that, as regards the performance of their ESCB tasks,205 NCB
Governors are neither national officials nor national representatives, but supra-
national experts in banking matters, and ad personam members of the Governing
Council, each with one, equally weighted vote: to assume that they will represent,
post-accession, national interests, while sitting at the Governing Council, is to
misunderstand their role, the hierarchical position of the ECB and the NCBs
within the Eurosystem and the aims of the ESCB.206
On the irrevocability of the adoption of the single currency, hinted to
above—and, by extension, on the lasting nature of the commitments associated
with its adoption—suffice it to point to Article 3 TEU,207 as well as to Article
140(3) TFEU, and Protocol 24 to the Treaty of Maastricht on the Member
States’ transition to the third stage of EMU.208 By expressly referring to the
202 The only exception to the ‘one man one vote’ rule applicable to the deliberations of the
Governing Council is where patrimonial issues are concerned (ie issues relating to the ECB’s capital
or to the transfer of foreign reserves or to the allocation of profits and losses within the ESCB), where
the NCB Governors’ votes are weighted to reflect the share of each NCB in the ECB’s capital, as per
Art. 10.3 of the Statute.
203 The reference is to Guideline ECB 2011/14 of 20 September 2011 on monetary policy instru-
ments and procedures of the Eurosystem (recast), OJ L 331, 14 December 2011, 1, the euro area’s
common ‘rule book’ for the conduct of monetary policy operations. Whilst the last four years—in
other words the period broadly spanning the time between the onset of the financial crisis and its
de´nouement—have witnessed a gradual but appreciable shift towards more discretion in the parti-
cipating NCBs’ implementation of the single monetary policy, the Eurosystem’s approach to mon-
etary policy implementation remains overwhelmingly rule-based.
204 The reference is to the Eurosystem’s key operational principle whereby, to the extent possible, the
ECB shall have recourse to NCBs to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the
Eurosystem. In order to ensure that decentralization does not hamper the smooth functioning of
the Eurosystem, NCBs have to act in accordance with ECB Guidelines and Instructions, as the ECB’s
‘operating arms’. Where operations can be carried out more effectively if directly handled by the
ECB, the ECB will instead act in a centralized manner. It is noted that the principle of decentral-
ization applies to operations only, while decision-making and legislation remain centralized.
205 The ESCB tasks are defined in Art. 127(2) TFEU and in Art. 3 of the Statute.
206 The point is not uncontested: some consider the NCB Governors as (predominantly) national
officials, representing their home institutions when sitting in the ECB Governing Council (see, for
instance, P Stanek, ‘How to Assess Proposals for Enlargement Reform of The European Central
Bank’ (2004) 91(5) Revue de l’OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, 209–39, 228). For an in-depth
assessment of this issue see P Athanassiou, ‘Reflections on the Modalities for the Appointment of
the National Central Bank Governors’ (2014) 39 European Law Review, 27–47.
207 It follows from this provision that the establishment of ‘an economic and monetary union whose
currency is the euro’ is among the list of objectives of the EU.
208 Member States inter alia declared ‘the irreversible character of the Community’s movement to
the third stage of EMU’, inter alia stating that all preparatory work should be concluded by 1998 ‘in
order to enable the Community to enter into the third stage irrevocably on 1 January 1999’.
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establishment of EMU as an EU objective and to the ‘irrevocable’ fixing of the
conversion rates at which national currencies are to be exchanged for the euro,
the foregoing provisions draw attention to the irreversibility of the process
leading to a Member State’s adoption of the single currency and, thereafter,
to its lasting character.209 It is also for that reason that to extrapolate, as some
have, from the recently introduced Article 50 TEU, anything akin to a unilateral
right of withdrawal from EMU (without a parallel withdrawal from the EU), is
legally flawed.210 EMU is no ‘revolving door’ through which participating
Member States can enter or exit, at will, their EU membership-derived rights
and obligations as members of the monetary union. The irreversibility of the
EMU accession process and the permanence of the commitments it comes with
are legal realities that new state entities (including those resulting from seces-
sion) willing to accede to the EU would need to appreciate and accept.211
What is also worth drawing attention to is that the permanent limitation,
referred to at the start of this subscetion, in the decision-making autonomy of a
participating Member State (or its monetary policy authority) consequent on
EMU accession extends beyond the field of monetary policy. More specifically,
whilst recognizing that the NCBs ‘may perform functions other than those
specified in this Statute’, Article 14.4 of the Statute allows the Governing
Council to object, by a two-thirds majority, to any non-ESCB operations carried
out by a participating Member State NCB (including ELA, foreign reserves asset
management, or own investment operations), which the Governing Council
deems to interfere with the implementation of the single monetary policy.
The effet utile of Article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute would, in principle, permit
the Governing Council to impose whatever conditions it deems fit before exer-
cising its (negative) discretion not to object to an operation that a participating
Member State NCB proposes to undertake. Besides, it follows from Article
127(4) TFEU and Article 4 of the Statute that the legislative bodies of the
Member States are required to consult the ECB in respect of any draft national
legislative provisions falling within the ECB’s field of competence. The ECB’s
advisory role is inter alia intended to ensure that no national legal act falling
within its field of competence is adopted without its prior consultation.212
209 See C Zilioli and M Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (Hart, Oxford, 2001) 15;
C Proctor, ‘The Future of the Euro—What Happens if a Member State Leaves?’ (2006) 17 European
Business Law Review 909, 924–5; and Athanassiou (n 2) 13–14.
210 In this regard see, generally, Athanassiou (n 2) fn.1; and <https://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
20121107_morganti.en.pdf> last accessed on 31 August 2013. The reason why the Treaty of Lisbon
does not provide for the possibility of withdrawing from EMU without a parallel withdrawal from
the EU is precisely because of the irreversibility of the transition to the third stage of EMU.
211 On the irrevocability of the transfer of monetary policy competences to the ECB, see C Zilioli,
‘National Emergency Powers and Exclusive Community Competences—A Crack in the Dam?’ in
Legal Aspects of the European System of Central Banks (Liber Amicorum Paolo Zamboni Garavelli)
(European Central Bank, 2005) 115–33.
212 For an account of the legal parameters of the ECB’s advisory tasks see, generally, A Arda,
‘Consulting the European Central Bank—Legal Aspects of the Community and National
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The procedural aspects of the ECB’s advisory role are set out in Council
Decision 98/415/EC on the ECB’s consultation by national authorities regard-
ing draft legislative provisions,213 which is drafted in general terms and applies
to all EU Member States (whether or not they have acceded to EMU).214
A failure to consult the ECB on a draft national legislative provision within
its fields of competence could lead to infringement proceedings before the
CJEU, brought by the European Commission against the Member State con-
cerned, in accordance with Article 258 TFEU.215 The duty of consultation
under the Decision is precise and unconditional, which means that individuals
can rely upon it before national courts. To date, national courts have not been
asked to rule on the validity or enforceability of a national provision adopted
without a prior consultation of the ECB, and no request for a preliminary ruling
in this matter has so far been addressed to the CJEU. However, the CJEU has
repeatedly ruled on the enforceability of national provisions adopted without
prior notification to the European Commission, as required by certain EU legal
acts, and has held that such provisions are unenforceable against individuals if
adopted in breach of substantial procedural requirements.216
Apart from the aforementioned lasting, institutional implications of the adop-
tion of the single currency, accession to the euro area also entails certain financial
obligations for acceding Member States or their NCBs. The magnitude of these
obligations has increased considerably in recent years, on account of the joint
euro area efforts to stem the sustained European sovereign debt crisis, to address
the acute financial and economic difficulties experienced by a number of EMU
Member States and to prevent contagion. Starting with the non-crisis-related
costs of accession to EMU, the NCBs of participating Member States are to first
contribute, as shareholders, to the capital of the ECB, in accordance with the
ECB’s ‘capital subscription key’;217 second, they are to transfer foreign reserve
Authorities’ Obligation to Consult the ECB Pursuant to Art. 105(4) EC’, (2004) 1 European
Banking and Financial Law Journal (Euredia) 111–52.
213 OJ L 189, 3 July 1998, 42–3.
214 The notable exception is that of the UK, which is exempt from the obligation to consult the ECB
under the terms of paras 4 and 7 of Protocol 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, annexed to the Treaty (also see Recital 7 of Council Decision
98/415/EC).
215 If an NCB endowed with regulatory powers fails to consult the ECB, the ECB can itself com-
mence infringement proceedings under Art. 271(d) TFEU and Art. 35.6 of the Statute, which
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the CJEU in disputes concerning the fulfilment by NCBs of obli-
gations under the Treaty and the ESCB Statute.
216 See, inter alia: Case 174/84, Bulk Oil [1986] ECR 559; Case 380/87, Enichem Base [1989] ECR
2491; Case C-194/94, CIA Security International [1996] ECR I-2201; Case C-226/97, Lemmens
[1998] ECR I-3711; Case C-235/95, AGS Assedic Pas-de-Calais [1998] ECR I-4531; Case C-443/
98, Unilever [2000] ECR I-7535; Case C-159/00, Sapod Audic [2002] I-5031.
217 The NCBs’ shares in the capital of the ECB are calculated using a key reflecting their respective
share in the total population and gross domestic product of the EU. These two determinants have
equal weighting. The ECB adjusts the shares every five years and whenever a new country joins
the EU.
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assets to the ECB, in accordance with Article 30 of the Statute,218 and third they
are to share in the ECB’s net losses (and, reciprocally, in its net profits).219
No less importantly, EMU-acceding Member States are under an obligation to
contribute to the subscribed capital of the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), a permanent Treaty-based intergovernmental organization220 tasked
with assisting in preserving financial stability by providing temporary financial
assistance to troubled euro area Member States.221 Participating Member States
had previously been involved in funding the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF), the ESM’s precursor (which, unlike the ESM, obtained finan-
cing by issuing bonds or other debt instruments on the financial markets, based
on guarantees for its liabilities provided by the euro area Member States).222
While all contributing Member States are potential beneficiaries of the unpre-
cedented safety net provided through the establishment of the EFSF-ESM, the
cost implications of their establishment can be significant for existing and
EMU-acceding Member States alike. Overall, the public expenditure required
to meet the financial obligations and liabilities outlined above (including the
non-crisis-related ones) will need to be factored into any comprehensive assess-
ment of the economic costs and benefits of secession, becoming part of the
political narrative of the merits and rationale of secession.
218 The Statute distinguishes between official ‘foreign reserve assets’ (which include gold and other
precious metals) transferred to the ECB, in line with Art. 30 of the Statute, and those held and
managed by the participating Member State NCBs. The Statute imposes certain restrictions in
connection with transactions over ‘foreign reserve assets’ held and managed by the participating
Member State NCBs. In particular, Art. 31.2 of the Statute provides for the approval of the
Governing Council in case of foreign reserve asset operations above a certain threshold established
by the Governing Council ‘in order to ensure consistency with the exchange rate and monetary
policies of the Union.’ Even Member States’ transactions with their ‘foreign exchange working
balances’, above a certain threshold, are subject to such approval from the ECB (see Guideline
ECB/2003/12 of 23 October 2003 for participating Member States’ transactions with their foreign
exchange working balances pursuant to Art. 31.3 of the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank, OJ L 283/81, 31 October 2003; Zilioli and Selmayr
(n 209), 102; and R Smits, The European Central Bank—Institutional Aspects (Kluwer, The
Netherlands 1998) 199–201).
219 The net profits and losses of the ECB are allocated among the euro area NCBs in accordance
with Art. 33 of the Statute. As the balance sheet of the ECB has expanded considerably since the start
of the European sovereign debt crisis, if they were to ever materialize, losses could, be substantial.
These losses would, ultimately, be borne by the NCB’s home Member States, as there is an implicit
Treaty-based duty for Member States to replenish the capital of their NCBs in the event of losses, in
the interests of preserving their financial independence.
220 The Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism was signed on 2 February 2012,
establishing the ESM. The ESM was finally inaugurated on 8 October 2012 upon completion of the
ratification process by the euro area Member States.
221 The ESM will have total subscribed capital of E700 billion provided by euro area Member
States; E80 billion of this will be in the form of paid-in capital with the remaining E620 billion as
callable capital.
222 The EFSF was established on 7 June 2010 as a Luxembourgish law socie´te´ anonyme, mandated to
provide financial assistance on a temporary basis. The EFSF will continue to service existing com-
mitments even after 30 June 2013, the date of its substitution by the ESM.
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In short, and without prejudice to the unquestionable long-term political,
strategic, structural, and financial benefits of EMU participation,223 EMU ac-
cession entails a handful of momentous institutional and financial consequences,
which the decade of prosperity and macroeconomic stability preceding the on-
set of the financial crisis had somewhat obfuscated or whose import it had
blurred.224 The establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism is set to
signal a further highly significant, medium- to short-term institutional shift,
this time in terms of supervisory responsibility over (some of the) credit insti-
tutions operating within the EU (and, especially, EMU): following an agreement
reached by the Eurogroup on 13 December 2012, and the adoption of the SSM
Regulation,225 banking supervision is to be transferred from the competent
national supervisory authorities to the ECB,226 as a first step towards a genuine
banking union, also involving, at a later stage, a single resolution authority, a
common resolution fund and a single deposit guarantee scheme. In the longer
term, just as the single currency has been the logical culmination of the single
market, EMU participation could usher in fiscal and, perhaps, also political
union.
A final remark is apposite on the impact of the on-going European sovereign
debt crisis, already in its fourth year at the time of writing. The crisis has
brought to the fore the advantages inherent in a Member State’s participation
in a monetary policy model of which the euro area is a unique and unprece-
dented example, in terms of organized solidarity, but also its strictures. One of
the bitter lessons of the European sovereign debt crisis is that euro area mem-
bership presupposes a lasting commitment on the part of all participating
Member States to observe, unswervingly, the ‘rules of the game’, laid down in
the Stability and Growth Pact,227 by inter alia avoiding excessive deficits, con-
stantly improving on their competitiveness and steering clear of labour market
223 These include increased price stability, deeper financial markets with lower financial transaction
costs, thanks to the suppression of multiple European exchange rates, enhanced competition for
goods and services and financial support at times of crisis).
224 These include loss of monetary policy and exchange rate-setting autonomy, conversion of the
NCB of a participating Member State from a purely national instance into an operational arm of
the ECB, financial contribution to the ECB’s share capital and to any losses it may incur, transfer to
the ECB of foreign reserve assets, loss of autonomy in terms of the Member States’ use of their non-
transferred foreign reserve assets, and, last but not least, contribution to the capital of the ESM.
225 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institu-
tions, OJ L 287, 29 October 2013, 63.
226 The proposed transfer is all the more important considering that, in the case of EMU participat-
ing Member State NCBs, banking supervision is their most important non-ESCB-related task.
227 The Stability and Growth Pact, as amended over time, aims at safeguarding macroeconomic
stability in the euro area. It focuses, in particular, on the maintenance of fiscal discipline through
enhanced surveillance of the fiscal positions of EMU participants. In particular, under the Pact, each
EMU participant should aim at a medium-term position that is at least close to balance so that in the
face of normal cyclical fluctuations there would be a sufficient margin of safety to avoid deficits in
excess of 3% of GDP. Unless a general government deficit in excess of the 3% cent ceiling is deemed
exceptional and temporary, the Council of Ministers can impose financial sanctions based on a
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rigidities, since their margin of manoeuvre is bound to be narrower, at times of
crisis, compared to that of outsiders. The political establishments in seceding
state entities will need to internalize this lesson, and prepare their public opin-
ions for the lasting fiscal and budgetary discipline necessary for them to reap the
full benefits of euro area participation (as well as for its medium- and longer-
term implications, briefly drawn attention to above). Positing as automatic the
accession of a new state entity to EMU does not appear likely to help instil that
discipline, nor is it likely to contribute towards familiarizing public opinion in a
newly created state entity with the concrete consequences of and obligations
deriving from EMU accession.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper has been to make a modest but informed contribution to
the debate regarding secession and its consequences for EU membership. Having
examined in Part I the issue of secession, from an EU and a PIL law perspective,
we have come to the conclusion that there is no automatic right to EU accession,
and no right of succession for a newly created state entity. EU membership talks
would, in the authors’ opinion, be mandatory both in terms of outcome
(through the enlargement process) and in terms of procedure (through the
enlargement criteria), even if it may be possible for the accession procedure
to be simplified or expedited, subject to negotiations, because a newly created
state entity resulting from secession may be better able to satisfy the admission
requirements compared to a genuine novice. However significant their impact
on the debate, arguments drawn from the protection of fundamental rights and,
in particular, from the notion of EU Citizenship would appear to do little to
change that conclusion.
Part II has drawn attention to the concrete consequences of EMU accession
for new Member States (including state entities resulting from secession).
Although participation to EMU is mandatory for all EU Member States, it
does not derive automatically from EU membership, being instead subject to
conditionality outside the enlargement process. Starting from the premise that
the Treaty is silent on the possibility of an internal EMU enlargement, it has
been argued that, unless the Treaty were to be amended, state entities created
through secession from EMU-participating Member States would have to follow
the same path to EMU accession as their precursors, despite having formerly
been part of an EMU-participating Member State. The legally obligatory char-
acter of EMU accession, as a contractual obligation derived from EU member-
ship, has also been drawn attention to.
predetermined procedure (the Excessive Deficit Procedure). The Council of Ministers can impose
financial sanctions, when deemed appropriate.
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One final remark is apposite on the implications of the crisis-driven process of
European integration for the secession debate. The gradual pooling of sover-
eignty among EU and EMU Member States over so broad a range of core issues
(from monetary policy and banking supervision to fiscal competences, bank
resolution and deposit insurance) accelerated by the sovereign debt crisis may,
perhaps, call into question the rationale and practical impact of secession, cast-
ing it in the light of an oddity, at a time of ever closer EU and EMU conver-
gence. Given their import, the institutional, legal, economic, and budgetary
consequences of EU and EMU accession, including future changes towards
further transfers of sovereignty on account of the fallout of the European sov-
ereign debt crisis, would need to be explained to and understood by public
opinion in any of the Member States where secession is on the table. Without
clarity and transparency on the issues touched on above there is a risk of deci-
sions being taken the practical consequences of which have not been exhaust-
ively thought through despite the existence of readily available legal tools
through which to come to the right conclusions.
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